Strength of the social dilemma in a public goods experiment: An exploration of the error hypothesis

Willinger, Marc; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony

doi:10.1007/bf01670009

Cited by 21 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The results of the present paper also hold when preferences are captured by quadratic utility functions:

U^{i} (x_{i}, x_{- i}, {\hat{x}}_{i}) = α_{i} (w - x_{i}) - {(() w_{i} - x_{i})}^{2} + β_{i} (x_{i} + x_{- i}) - \frac{v_{i}}{2} {(() x_{i} - {\overset{x}{true}}_{i})}^{2} .

This family of functions, which allows for a dominant strategy equilibrium with strictly positive contributions, has been documented in the experimental literature by relatively few papers (Keser , Willinger and Ziegelmeyer , Bracht, Figuières, and Ratto ).…”

supporting

confidence: 71%

Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions

Figuières

Masclet

Willinger

2013

J Public Economic Theory

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CIRANOLe CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le Résumé / AbstractCet article présente un modèle théorique qui permet d'expliquer le déclin des contributions observé dans les expériences de contribution volontaire au financement de biens publics répétés à horizon fini. Ce modèle s'appuie sur l'idée de motivation morale faible selon laquelle les agents auraient une motivation intrinsèque à contribuer un montant non nul au bien public et que cette motivation intrinsèque serait conditionnée à l'observation des contributions des autres membres du groupe. Ce modèle est compatible avec la persistance de la sur-contribution, la variabilité inter et intra individuelle dans les montants de contributions et l'effet de « restart ».

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“…The results of the present paper also hold when preferences are captured by quadratic utility functions:

U^{i} (x_{i}, x_{- i}, {\hat{x}}_{i}) = α_{i} (w - x_{i}) - {(() w_{i} - x_{i})}^{2} + β_{i} (x_{i} + x_{- i}) - \frac{v_{i}}{2} {(() x_{i} - {\overset{x}{true}}_{i})}^{2} .

supporting

confidence: 71%

Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions

Figuières

Masclet

Willinger

2013

J Public Economic Theory

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“…Interior equilibrium designs show that not all contributions are errors (Sefton and Steinberg, 1996;Isaac and Walker, 1998;Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 2001). Designs which compare play against computers with that against people indicate that the error rate may nonetheless be substantial (Kurzban and Houser, 2001;Houser and Kurzban, 2002;Ferraro et al, 2003) investigate motivational heterogeneity, in a game where subjects repeatedly make a provisional decision then respond to the putative aggregate contribution, with the process terminating at random.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Experimetrics of Public Goods: Inferring Motivations from Contributions

Bardsley

Moffatt

2006

Theor Decis

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In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007altruism, finite mixture models, reciprocity, tobit, trembles, voluntary contributions, C1, C9, H4,

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“…The return on contributions to the public good depended on one's own contributions and those by the other group members. To limit the risk that players get stuck in corner solutions where potential corruption (or any other intervention) could not show much effect, we used a non‐linear contribution mechanism (Keser, ; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, ; Fenig et al ., ) that leads to interior solutions for any behavior between best‐response play and efficiency. Specifically, we use a quadratic return function for contributions to the public good:

g_{i} = g false(x_{i} + X_{- i} false) = \frac{1}{N} false(a (X - C) - b {false(X - C false)}^{2} false),

where

X : = {normalΣ}_{i = 1}^{N} x_{i}

denotes total contributions and X ‐ i : = Σ k ≠ i x k .…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Fochmann

Jahnke

Wagener

2018

Scottish J Political Eco

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Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that ‘the system’ had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.

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Strength of the social dilemma in a public goods experiment: An exploration of the error hypothesis

Cited by 21 publications

References 15 publications

Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions

Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions

The Experimetrics of Public Goods: Inferring Motivations from Contributions

Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment

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