Streamlining Local Behaviour through Communication, Incentives and Control: A Case Study of Local Environmental Policies in China

Abstract

This article describes how China uses evaluation ratings and monitoring as incentives in order to foster the implementation of environmental policies at the local level. It is argued that decentralisation in China leaves room for actors at the local levels to manoeuver and bargain with those on higher levels for flexible adjustment of implementation policies according to local conditions. However, decentralisation is accompanied by significant institutional changes in the structure of intergovernmental communication, incentives and control. Accordingly, decentralisation in China exhibits a specific design which leaves space for divergent local environmental policies while also engendering “grassroots mechanisms”. On the whole, this new institutional setting benefits the implementation of environmental policies.

Understanding Blame Politics in China's Decentralized System of Environmental Governance: Actors, Strategies and Context

“…Heberer and Senz 2011;Kostka and Hobbs 2012. 42 "Qidong protest" was an environmental protest against a proposed wastewater pipeline in Qidong, part of Nantong, Jiangsu province in 2012. The local government cancelled the planned project because of this protest.…”

Collaborative Governance for Sustainable Development in China

“…The attempt to identify factors that facilitate collaborative governance arrangements fills a gap in political science research and complements research activities based on case studies of environmental governance or governance for sustainable development in China (e.g. Heberer & Senz, 2011;Yang, 2015).…”

Target Interactions and Target Aspiration Level Adaptation: How Do Government Leaders Tackle the “Environment‐Economy” Nexus?

“…The State Council issued the Method for Assessing the Total Emissions of Major Pollutants in 2007 to establish a “one‐vote veto” rule for the nonaccomplishment of mandatory pollutant emission reduction targets. Generally, local governments that failed to meet the pollutant emission reduction targets were ineligible to be evaluated as excellent or outstanding, and their chief leaders lost the chance to be promoted (Heberer and Senz 2011; Xue et al 2014). Under the “one‐vote veto” rule, local governments were expected to spare no effort to meet mandatory obligatory pollutant emission reduction targets.…”