Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network

Kawasaki, Takehiro; Barrot, Nathanaël; Takanashi, Seiji; Todo, Taiki; Yokoo, Makoto

doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5579

Cited by 17 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…In contrast, under a network structure, to protect the benefit of the buyers, we may hide the sale information from their descendants. Kawasaki et al [2020] first considered non-wastefulness in social networks. We will also define non-wastefulness in our setting.…”

Section: The Model and Standard Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Mechanism design in social networks has become an active research area [Li et al 2017[Li et al , 2018Zhao et al 2018;Kawasaki et al 2020;Xu and He 2020]. The classical auctions only sell items to buyers directly connected to the seller and do not consider spreading the commodity information through the network links between buyers to get possibly higher utilities [Nisan et al 2007;Bajari and Hortacsu 2003].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This may discourage sellers' participation in auctions. Recently, Kawasaki et al [2020] gave a strategy-proof mechanism for this model that guarantees a non-negative revenue.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets

Xiao

Song

Khoussainov

2022

AAAI

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We study multi-unit auctions in social networks, where each buyer has a fixed budget and can spread the sale information to the network neighbors. We design a mechanism encouraging buyers to report their valuations truthfully and spread the sale information. Our design uses the idea of the clinching mechanism to decide the transaction price and can be viewed as a network version of the mechanism. Most of the previous clinching mechanisms search for the transaction prices by increasing the current price. Our mechanism directly computes the transaction prices in polynomial time. Furthermore, the mechanism applies a technique to iteratively activate new buyers in the network. This ensures utility preservations of the buyers and benefits the seller. We prove key properties of our mechanism, such as no-positive-transfers, individual rationality, incentive compatibility, non-wastefulness and social welfare preservation.

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Section: The Model and Standard Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets

Xiao

Song

Khoussainov

2022

AAAI

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“…However, these works consider little about agents' incentive design and equilibrium reasoning with the social interactions. Besides the query incentive network problems, there have been some very recent works on mechanism design in social networks [Li et al, 2017, Zhao et al, 2018, Jeong and Lee, 2020, Kawasaki et al, 2020. As far as we know, all these works concentrate on introducing social networks into typical auction problems which are quite different from contest design and these works do not treat graph based BNE analysis as their central problem.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Invitation in Crowdsourcing Contests

Shi¹,

Dong²

2021

Preprint

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In a crowdsourcing contest, a requester holding a task posts it to a crowd. People in the crowd then compete with each other to win the rewards. Although in real life, a crowd is usually networked and people influence each other via social ties, existing crowdsourcing contest theories do not aim to answer how interpersonal relationships influence peoples' incentives and behaviors, and thereby affect the crowdsourcing performance. In this work, we novelly take peoples' social ties as a key factor in the modeling and designing of agents' incentives for crowdsourcing contests. We then establish a new contest mechanism by which the requester can impel agents to invite their neighbours to contribute to the task. The mechanism has a simple rule and is very easy for agents to play. According to our equilibrium analysis, in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium agents' behaviors show a vast diversity, capturing that besides the intrinsic ability, the social ties among agents also play a central role for decision-making. After that, we design an effective algorithm to automatically compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the invitation crowdsourcing contest and further adapt it to large graphs. Both theoretical and empirical results show that, the invitation crowdsourcing contest can substantially enlarge the number of contributors, whereby the requester can obtain significantly better solutions without a large advertisement expenditure.

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“…Another more challenging open question is to design similar mechanisms for multiple heterogeneous items settings. It has been shown that the problem becomes extremely difficult when we move just one step forward from single-item to multiple homogeneous items cases [20,51]. The difficulty comes from the fact that the allocation and price of one participant can be easily influenced by its invitees and siblings [51].…”

Section: Resource Allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions

Zhao¹

2021

Preprint

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Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the set of participants are fixed and known to the mechanism (the market owner) in advance. However, in practice, the market owner can only directly reach a small number of participants (her neighbours). Hence the owner often needs costly promotions to recruit more participants in order to get desirable outcomes such as social welfare or revenue maximization. In this paper, we propose to incentivize existing participants to invite their neighbours to attract more participants. However, they would not invite each other if they are competitors. We discuss how to utilize the conflict of interest between the participants to incentivize them to invite each other to form larger markets. We will highlight the early solutions and open the floor for discussing the fundamental open questions in the settings of auctions, coalitional games, matching and voting.

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Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network

Cited by 17 publications

References 10 publications

Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets

Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets

Invitation in Crowdsourcing Contests

Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions

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