Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets

Xiao, Mingyu; Song, Yong; Khoussainov, Bakhadyr

doi:10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20458

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(57 reference statements)

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“…It affects the outcome of MUDAN-m. The idea of priorities to buyers has been exploited by several existing diffusion auction mechanisms, and three priority orderings were used: (1) depth-based selection [23] (2) distance-based selection [6], and (3) degree-based selection [18]. Yet their effectiveness has not been analysed.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Remarkably, two recent mechanisms for multi-unit diffusion auction have claimed to be truthful. First, the SNCA mechanism [18] extends the classical clinching auction to the social network context. Similar to DNA-MU, the mechanism grants a buyer who is closer to the seller in the social network a higher priority when determining the allocation of items.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Multi-Unit Auction over a Social Network

Fang,

Zhang,

Liu

et al. 2023

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

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Diffusion auction is an emerging business model where a seller aims to incentivise buyers in a social network to diffuse the auction information thereby attracting potential buyers. We focus on designing mechanisms for multi-unit diffusion auctions. Despite numerous attempts at this problem, existing mechanisms either fail to be incentive compatible (IC) or achieve only an unsatisfactory level of social welfare (SW). Here, we propose a novel graph exploration technique to realise multi-item diffusion auction. This technique ensures that potential competition among buyers stay “localised” so as to facilitate truthful bidding. Using this technique, we design multi-unit diffusion auction mechanisms MUDAN and MUDAN-m. Both mechanisms satisfy, among other properties, IC and 1/m-weak efficiency. We also show that they achieve optimal social welfare for the class of rewardless diffusion auctions. While MUDAN addresses the bottleneck case when each buyer demands only a single item, MUDAN-m handles the more general, multi-demand setting. We further demonstrate that these mechanisms achieve near-optimal social welfare through experiments.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Unit Auction over a Social Network

Fang,

Zhang,

Liu

et al. 2023

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Previous attempts, such as GIDM (Zhao et al 2018) and DNA-MU (Kawasaki et al 2020), failed to ensure IC due to buyers' potential manipulations for the auction outcome. Another mechanism, SNCA (Xiao, Song, and Khoussainov 2022), addressed budget constraints among buyers, but it deviates from the standard multi-unit diffusion auction. Consequently, achieving an IC mechanism remains an enticing challenge.…”

Section: The Number Of Initial Tradersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Double Auction on Diffusion Network

Li,

Cao,

Zhao

2024

AAAI

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Mechanism design on social networks has attracted extensive attention recently. The goal is to design mechanisms to incentivize participants to invite more participants via their social networks, and the challenge is that the participants are competitors. Various mechanisms have been proposed for single-/multiple-unit auctions, but it has been shown that it is challenging to design such mechanisms for more complex settings. We move this forward to investigate a double auction on a network where each trader (a buyer or a seller) can link to other buyers and sellers. Incentiving invitation is more difficult than in multi-unit one-sided auctions, because there are two different roles and a buyer (seller) seems happy to invite a seller (buyer), but again the invited seller (buyer) may invite another buyer (seller) to compete with the original buyer (seller). To combat this, we propose a solution called dynamic trade reduction (DTR), which also guarantees a non-negative revenue for the market owner. Interestingly, our solution is also applicable to the multi-unit one-sided auction when there is only one seller linking to only buyers on the network. We believe that the principle of our solution has the potential to be extended to design the multi-item one-sided auction.

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“…Li, Hao, and Zhao [18] characterized certain conditions for incentive compatible mechanisms. Moreover, there are numerous extended models that follow this research line, such as, network auctions under a multi-unit unitdemand setting studied by [29,12], multi-unit network auctions with budgets studied by [26], and many others [30,20,28]. Recent surveys of this area can be found in [9,17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Characterizations of Network Auctions and Generalizations of VCG

Xiao,

Lin,

Khoussainov

et al. 2023

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

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With the growth of networks, promoting products through social networks has become an important problem. For auctions in social networks, items are needed to be sold to agents in a network, where each agent can bid and also diffuse the sale information to her neighbors. Thus, the agents’ social relations are intervened with their bids in the auctions. In network auctions, the classical VCG mechanism fails to retain key properties. In order to better understand network auctions, in this paper, we characterize network auctions for the single-unit setting with respect to weak budget balance, individual rationality, incentive compatibility, efficiency, and other properties. For example, we present sufficient conditions for mechanisms to be efficient and (weakly) incentive compatible. With the help of these properties and new concepts such as rewards, participation rewards, and so on, we show how to design efficient mechanisms to satisfy incentive compatibility as much as possible, and incentive compatibility mechanisms to maximize the revenue. Our results provide insights into understanding auctions in social networks.

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Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets

Cited by 6 publications

References 29 publications

Multi-Unit Auction over a Social Network

Multi-Unit Auction over a Social Network

Double Auction on Diffusion Network

Characterizations of Network Auctions and Generalizations of VCG

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