Strategy of Civilian Joint Task Force Militia in Combating Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria

Abstract

Since 2013, the northern region of Nigeria has witnessed the unprecedented mobilization of militia group Civilian Joint Task Force to aid combating the Islamic fundamentalist Boko Haram. The participation of the militia was reportedly successful in routing the insurgent. Before the CJTF, Boko Haram defied most of the counterinsurgency measures of the government including the military and the political approaches. However, despite the successes of the CJTF, the strategy that influences the successes was not adequately known. This article, therefore, investigated the strategy of the CJTF that influences its successes. The study was conducted using a qualitative method designed in a case study. Data were collected from thirteen informants through in-depth interviews supported by non-participant observation. The finding shows that CJTF is a kind of informal self-defense group that emerged in response to the inadequate protections by the State. The combating successes of the group were influenced by the information-centric approach of its campaign. Careful intelligence gathering and procession along with the sociocultural linkage of the participants and in-depth knowledge over the physical terrain emerged influential to the groups’ combating. The article recommended that the Nigerian government should re-strategize its existing conventional counterinsurgency approach to adapt to the population-centric paradigm. The government should also adopt palliative measures of promoting sustainable counter-insurgency that should focus on inclusive governance, accountability, and addressing socio-economic issues of poverty and unemployment with all levels of seriousness rather than sticking to the security-only campaign.

Terörizmle Mücadele Eden Vijilanti Grupların Dönüşümü: Nijerya ve Güney Sudan Örnekleri

“…Ancak nihayetinde bu grubun istihbarat ve silahlı faaliyetleri aracılığıyla, Boko Haram kısa süre içerisinde önemli oranda güç kaybetmiştir. Bu nedenle de ilgili literatürde CJTF'nin Boko Haram terörüyle mücadele sürecindeki katkı ve rollerinden söz edildiği görülmektedir (Agbiboa, 2015;Eze & Agena, 2016;Ozden & Kwabe, 2019;Gana, 2020;Omitola vd., 2021). Ne var ki bu çalışmaların önemli bir kısmında grubun güvenlik tehdidi oluşturan eylemlerine çok az vurgu yapıldığı söylenebilir.…”

“…7-20). Bu bağlamda örneğin CJTF'ye yönelik bazı çalışmalarda; bu grubun terörizmle mücadele faaliyetlerindeki "rolleri" veya "katkılarından" söz edildiği görülmektedir (Agbiboa, 2015;Eze & Agena, 2016;Ozden & Kwabe, 2019;Gana, 2020;Omitola vd., 2021). Hatta bu tür grupların etkinlik ve verimliliği; bazı yazarlar tarafından "hükümetsiz yönetim" ve "hibrit yönetim" gibi kavramsallaştırmalar üzerinden ele alınarak alternatif bir devlet inşası modeli çerçevesinde okunmaktadır (Meagher, 2012).…”

Militia counterinsurgency: Understanding the drivers of states’ engagement of militias in counterinsurgency in northeast Nigeria

“…Amidst concerted counterinsurgency measures, the insurgent isolated to remote community of Kanamma in civil disobedience action to practice mundane life and religion. Government military measures to dislodge the movement further provoked the followers to full scale insurgency [21][22][23] . Nigeria's federal government, states governments in the Nigeria's northeast state of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) in support and collaboration of foreign governments adopted a far-reaching and multifaceted counterinsurgency measures to combat the insurgent, yet, the group ramped up its campaign of terror lynching fatal damage to social, psychological, economic and political damages to both the state and the citizenry.…”