Strategy, economic relations, and the definition of national interests

Abdelal, Rawi; Kirshner, Jonathan

doi:10.1080/09636419908429397

Cited by 64 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Many factors may help to explain limited US support for a US-Taiwan free trade agreement, including tepid support of free trade more broadly within the US Congress and doubts about Taiwan's own commitment to pursue the reforms necessary to make such an agreement feasible from a US Drezner ( 2003 ). 27 See Abdelal andKirshner ( 1999 /2000); Hirschman ( 1945 );and Kirshner ( 2008 ). For additional studies that explore these sorts of effects, see Hancock ( 2006 ); Richardson and Kegley ( 1980 );Roeder ( 1985 );and Skalnes ( 1998 ). perspective.…”

Section: How Could Deepening Economic Ties With Chinamentioning

confidence: 97%

US–China Economic Integration and its Implications for US Policy in the Taiwan Strait

Kastner

2014

Responding to China’s Rise

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Section: How Could Deepening Economic Ties With Chinamentioning

confidence: 97%

US–China Economic Integration and its Implications for US Policy in the Taiwan Strait

Kastner

2014

Responding to China’s Rise

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“…The need to take the role of norms seriously in international negotiations has been highlighted by the works of Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990), Checkel (1997), Abdelal and Kirshner (1999), Wiener (2004), Schmidt (2008), Kroenig et al, (2010), Lavenex and Schimmelfening (2010) among others. To use Kroenig's words, a negotiation process functions as a 'market place of ideas' (Kroenig et al 2010: 414) since the objective of a negotiation process is to change the preferences of at least one party.…”

Section: Rhetorical Credibility Mattersmentioning

confidence: 98%

Beyond Asymmetry: Substantive Beliefs in Preference Formation and Efficiency of Asymmetrical Negotiations

Munyi

2015

New Political Economy

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Contrary to extant propositions on the primacy of trade dependency in compelling faster agreement by subordinate states in asymmetrical economic negotiations, in the European Union-Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (EU -ACP) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, it is the states that were least materially vulnerable that were quickest to accept an EPA. Why so? I argue that the speed and propensity of ACP states to accept and ratify their EPAs were principally hinged on variances in preference formation based on what Ikenberry and Kupchan [(1990), 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', International Organization, 44 (3), pp. 283-315: 283] call 'substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs'. The quickest states to ratify an EPA were those which most intensely shared the EU's neoliberal belief in an automatic correlation between trade liberalisation and economic growth, rather than those that were most materially vulnerable. Therefore, by taking the normative sources of preference formation by subordinate states seriously, we can not only derive a parsimonious explanation of EPA negotiating efficiency but also form a foundational conceptual model of predicting efficiency in asymmetrical negotiations that unifies the role of both normative and material considerations.

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“…Integration has led to a dramatic shift in the policy orthodoxy in many countries as formerly socialist states warm up to market principles. Newly empowered domestic interests in turn reinforce a state's policy trajectory (Abdelal and Kirshner ). The fate of domestic industries and political coalitions has become increasingly tied to the fate of external commercial relationships and the economic structure as a whole.…”

Section: Durkheim and Systemic Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking the System Seriously: Another Liberal Theory of International Politics

Snyder

2013

Int Stud Rev

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Liberals have discovered the system level of analysis. Two somewhat competing strands of system-level liberal scholarship have emerged. The first emphasizes the system's normative dynamics and the democratic peace. The second has sought to conceive of capitalism as a property of the international system and theorize its effects. While a number of propositions and mechanisms have been identified, the literature has failed to develop an overarching account of system structure. Using Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic societies, and Waltz's tripartite definition of structure, this paper develops a liberal grand-theory that integrates these two strands of liberal systemic thinking. The theory generates a number of large propositions: the structure's dominant tendency is integration; it pushes states to specialize; and it induces a competitive normal politics. I also propose a typology of systems that vary according to liberal homogeneity and a liberal normative framework and mutual economic dependence, with important implications for the question of systemic stability. By way of conclusion, I offer a few thoughts on the value of grand-theorizing in International Relations.This article aims to deliver a systemic theory of international politics with distinctly liberal characteristics. This may seem like an impossible task because in its theoretical form, liberal theory is typically understood in three different ways: as centering on the domestic level of analysis (Milner 1997), as being dyadic (Doyle 1983), or as involving "bottom-up" preference aggregation (Moravcsik 1997). To date, it has been defined by its theoretical form, and not content.This contemporary understanding of liberal theory largely developed in opposition to top-down realist arguments centering on the system level of analysis. However, this dyadic and bottom-up understanding of liberal theory is fairly new. Consider, for example, the many nineteenth-century liberals such as Ricardo and Cobden who championed the idea that general prosperity could be created through freer trade at the regional or system level. Rosecrance (1986) has conceived of the system in terms of a trading world and a politico-military world. Others have argued that hegemonic power can contribute to the creation and maintenance of liberal order (Ikenberry 2001). Keohane and Nye (2001) have made the case that institutions and "complex interdependence" have modified the systemic tendencies of anarchy. Even Kant's Perpetual Peace, a work widely recognized as the foundation for the dyadic democratic peace, has been found to contain prominent "third image" implications (Huntley 1996;Harrison 2002). Defining theories in terms of assumptions and content-and

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Strategy, economic relations, and the definition of national interests

Cited by 64 publications

References 27 publications

US–China Economic Integration and its Implications for US Policy in the Taiwan Strait

US–China Economic Integration and its Implications for US Policy in the Taiwan Strait

Beyond Asymmetry: Substantive Beliefs in Preference Formation and Efficiency of Asymmetrical Negotiations

Taking the System Seriously: Another Liberal Theory of International Politics

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