Beyond Asymmetry: Substantive Beliefs in Preference Formation and Efficiency of Asymmetrical Negotiations

Abstract

Contrary to extant propositions on the primacy of trade dependency in compelling faster agreement by subordinate states in asymmetrical economic negotiations, in the European Union-Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (EU -ACP) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, it is the states that were least materially vulnerable that were quickest to accept an EPA. Why so? I argue that the speed and propensity of ACP states to accept and ratify their EPAs were principally hinged on variances in preference formation based on what Ikenberry and Kupchan [(1990), 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', International Organization, 44 (3), pp. 283-315: 283] call 'substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs'. The quickest states to ratify an EPA were those which most intensely shared the EU's neoliberal belief in an automatic correlation between trade liberalisation and economic growth, rather than those that were most materially vulnerable. Therefore, by taking the normative sources of preference formation by subordinate states seriously, we can not only derive a parsimonious explanation of EPA negotiating efficiency but also form a foundational conceptual model of predicting efficiency in asymmetrical negotiations that unifies the role of both normative and material considerations.

(Mis)Perceptions in Two‐ and Three‐Level Games: Detachment in Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations

“…Post-hoc lobbying can then delay the implementation process, as it reverses the 9 We expect that reaching an agreement becomes more likely if the negotiator's perceptions of the domestic win-set are more compatible with the other side's win-set compared to the actual domestic win-set. This could be the result of, firstly, a bias in the limited information available that makes the domestic win-set seem more compatible with the other side's winset, partly due to reliance on external information sources, or, secondly, because the belief system that shapes the negotiator's interpretation of the domestic win-set is closer to the other side's compared to the domestic constituents' belief system (see Munyi, 2016). presumably positive effect of public pressure groups: previously uninformed constituents are able to identify their preferences once an agreement is concluded and lobby against implementing legislation that misrepresents their preferences.…”

Limits to market power: Strategic discourse and institutional path dependence in the European Union–African, Caribbean and Pacific Economic Partnership Agreements

“…Hirschman, 1980 [1945]; Manger and Shadlen, 2014). This approach is not without merit — especially in relation to the Least Developed Country (LDC) members of the ACP, as we shall see — but it provides too few clues as to why regions and countries with high levels of trade dependence have been reluctant to conclude comprehensive agreements, and vice versa (Murray-Evans, 2015; Nyaga Munyi, 2015). The alternative solution is to look at the role of non-material factors in determining EPA outcomes, especially competing discursive representations of the developmental consequences of the agreements.…”

“…In this case, CARIFORUM negotiators were apparently persuaded by the EU’s argument that — in the absence of the protection afforded by the waiver — a reciprocal agreement was necessary in order to make preferences WTO-compatible (Heron, 2014: 15). There is also considerable evidence to suggest a ‘convergence of thinking’ (Bishop et al, 2013: 104) between Caribbean negotiators and EU officials in relation to the development benefits of trade liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation (Heron, 2011; Nyaga Munyi, 2015). The Caribbean group’s relative homogeneity and well-functioning regional institutional architecture also eased the negotiating process.…”

“…According to Chad Damro (2012: 682), the EU constitutes a ‘market power’ because of its ability to exercise leverage over third countries through the ‘externalisation of economic and social market-related policies and regulatory measures’. In the case of the EPAs, however, bargaining outcomes appear to be only weakly correlated with the EU’s market power vis-a-vis individual ACP regions and states (Murray-Evans, 2015; Nyaga Munyi, 2015). This discrepancy belies the general analytical thrust of much of the EU–ACP trade literature from the early 2000s, which interpreted the EPAs through the lens of the EU’s independent, political and commercial interests (Brewster et al, 2008; Farrell, 2005; Goodison, 2007; Hurt, 2003, 2010, 2012; Stoneman and Thompson, 2007).…”

“…One variant of this literature — which is of particular relevance to this article — draws attention to the non-material aspects of the EPAs and, more particularly, the role of transnational advocacy coalitions (ACP governments, sceptical EU member states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and activists) in rebutting the EU’s depiction of the EPAs as ‘non-coercive’ and ‘development-friendly’, and, instead, portraying them as coercive, driven by commercial self-interest and potentially deeply damaging to the ACP. Elijah Nyaga Munyi (2015), meanwhile, attributes the successes and failures of the EPA negotiations to the degree of (neoliberal) norm convergence between EU trade officials and their counterparts in the ACP.…”