“…First, it can be seen as a compromise between 'economist' and 'monetarist' arguments,22 involving a phased combination of growing convergence and increasing exchange rate stability. Secondly, it was a way of reassuring national politicians that the future monetary arrangements would be viable as well as desirable by moving gradually closer to monetary union; here it reflected longstanding 'neofunctionalist ' thinking about how high-level decisions can be broken down into a large number of low-level decisions so that politicians are led to take the big decisions in a series of small steps (Cobham, 1989). Thirdly, the Delors-Maastricht strategy can be seen as a means of persuading Germany to participate, by convincing Germany that the other countries were serious about EMU, by letting Germany design the system so that it would have an incentive to join, and/or by setting criteria which would limit entry to prevent the new arrangements from being diluted by countries less disciplined than Germany (see, in particular, De Grauwe, 1994a).…”