Strategic Simplification: Toward a Theory of Modular Design in Negotiation

Abstract

Using Richard Holbrooke's negotiations in Bosnia as an instructive example, this article examines structural complexity as a barrier to agreement and proposes approaches to "strategic simplification" that are inspired by research on modular design of new products. This article represents an initial step toward development of a broader theory of complexity management in negotiation.

Bargaining over Weapons: Justice and Effectiveness in Arms Control Negotiations

“…The inclusion of more parties and, with them, more issues can indeed expand the scope for joint gains and the possibility of an agreement (Sebenius 1983). More commonly, however, the complexity of a large number of participating parties creates barriers to reaching agreement (Watkins 2003). Adhering to p j principles in such a context risks giving free play and room for conflicting interests to emerge, which may undermine the possibilities for obtaining an effective agreement.…”

Construction Dispute Research

“…In such situations, negotiators tend to use different arguments to support what is being sought in each situation and to justify the minima (Fells 1996). Furthermore, as Watkins (2003) suggested, negotiating easy issues first is a Fig. 15.2 The confidence index of distributive and integrative negotiating tactics complexity reduction approach.…”

Teaching Students to Shape the Game: Negotiation Architecture and the Design of Manageably Dynamic Simulations

“…New players, such as decision makers who had been acting through agents, may be induced to come to the table; other parties may be cut out (Lax and Sebenius 1991). Linkages — that is, relationships between simultaneous negotiations in which agreement in one issue requires agreement in all — may be created or eliminated (Watkins 2003; Watkins and Passow 1996). Issues may be added or resequenced to enlarge the potential for agreement; toxic issues may be set aside or deferred.…”