Strategic responses of NGOs to the new party-building campaign in China

Abstract

Over the last decade, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has sought to assimilate the third sector – non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – through its party-building campaign. This article examines NGOs’ strategies in response to this campaign, based on in-depth interviews with 64 NGOs and local cadres. We find that NGOs have developed three main strategies to respond to the CCP’s attempts to penetrate their organizations. First, NGOs embedded in the party-state system and those affiliated with private enterprises tend to acquiesce to party building out of habit and for compliance reasons, respectively. Second, those with multiple stakeholders generally compromise in the party-building process, acting as passive compliers if they depend more on non-state resources, or active players if they rely more on state resources. Third, civic NGOs that advocate causes inconsistent with the ruling regime might avoid party building as a resistant strategy, by either disguising their nonconformity or escaping from the control of the ruling regime entirely. NGOs’ strategic responses are contingent on their negotiating power, which results from their resource dependence and the party’s enforcement dilemmas. This article contributes to our understanding of the recent party-building campaign from an institutional perspective, and enriches our knowledge about relations between the party and the third sector.

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“…Besides sharpening long-standing survival skills, NGOs are developing strategies to live with new restrictions, too. In response to the overseas NGO law, grassroots social organizations have reduced connections with foreign countries and diversified their financial backing, relying on other (often less reliable) sources, such as social media and crowdfunding, as well as government contracts for projects and service delivery (Tsai and Wang, 2019;Nie and Wu, 2022). Some NGOs have turned the party-building campaign to their own purposes, using it "to strengthen their political capital and demonstrate their political loyalty" (Nie and Wu, 2022: 52).…”

“…By 2013, the CCP’s “Document No. 9” had identified civil society promotion as one of the seven threats to party rule (ChinaFile, 2013), and two years later the government called for enhanced party-building and the setting up of party branches in social organizations nationwide (Nie and Wu, 2022). 19 Although the 2016 Charity Law eased registration requirements and opened a path to public fundraising, it raised questions about whether advocacy counted as charity work, warned that organizations should not “violate social morality,” and did little for grassroots NGOs faced with local authorities who would not recognize that they were a charity or used registration as a pretext to control or suppress them (Spires, 2020; see also Li, 2021).…”

“…Some NGOs have turned the party-building campaign to their own purposes, using it “to strengthen their political capital and demonstrate their political loyalty” (Nie and Wu, 2022: 52). These NGOs establish a party branch in order to acquire resources and safeguard their discretion: collaborating with the party to provide social services, while letting the government claim credit and even wearing party badges to show their recognition of CCP leadership, is an acceptable price to pay for a more secure place in the political system (Nie and Wu, 2022). 21 In Shanghai, a closer relationship with the party “desensitized” a “troublemaking” labor NGO that no longer faces as much monitoring or having its bank accounts closed and donations blocked (Xin and Huang, 2022: 440).…”

“… 21. Some NGOs resist party-building, for example, by setting up liaisons to meet the party’s minimum requirements but then failing to oversee their activities, or by avoiding party-building entirely (Nie and Wu, 2022). …”