Strategic Power in the European Union

Steunenberg, Bernard; Schmidtchen, Dieter; Koboldt, Christian

doi:10.1177/0951692899011003005

Cited by 124 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Within non-cooperative game theory assuming one unique equilibrium Steunenberg et al (1999) have suggested a power index based on the distance between a player's ideal point and the equilibrium outcome of a game. Within cooperative game theory power indices are more common (Banzhaf, 1965;Johnston, 1978;Holler, 1984;Shapley, 1953;Shapley and Shubik, 1954).…”

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confidence: 99%

Stubbornness, Power, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Multiple Equilibria

Hausken

2006

Theor Decis

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Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 games with two pure strategy equilibria has the property that a reduction in the cost of holding out corresponds to an increase in conflict. This article takes the opposite view, arguing that if losing becomes less costly, a player is less likely to gamble to win, which means that conflict will be less frequent. This approach leads to a new power index and a new measure of stubbornness, both anchored in strategic reasoning. The win probability defined as power constitutes an equilibrium refinement which differs from Harsanyi and Selten's [(1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge] refinement. In contrast, Axelrod's approach focuses on preferences regarding divergences from imaginary outmost rewards that cannot be obtained jointly. The player who is less powerful in an asymmetric one-shot game becomes more powerful in the repeated game, provided he or she values the future sufficiently more than the opponent. This contrasts with the view that repetition induces cooperation, but conforms with the expectation that a more patient player receives a larger share of the pie.

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confidence: 99%

Stubbornness, Power, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Multiple Equilibria

Hausken

2006

Theor Decis

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“…al. 2002;Franchino, 2000;Pollack, 2003b;Steunenberg, Schmidtchen, & Koboldt, 1999). Yet, functionalist approaches have looked at them as channels of expertise, which are detached from political bargaining, and which serve the purpose of efficient problem-solving (Majone, 2005;Scharpf, 1988;Wessels, 1998).…”

Section: Mapping the Institutional Landscape: The Commission's Decisimentioning

confidence: 99%

Expertise, politics and public opinion at the crossroads of the European Commission’s decision-making: The case of Glyphosate.

Bazzan¹,

Migliorati²

2020

irpp

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With the growing politicisation of European Union (EU) integration, the European Commission is increasingly facing a tension between technocratic and responsive decision-making. How does this tension play out in the process of supranational implementation under comitology rules? We argue that the tension between the Commission´s role as a technocrat and as a responsive bureaucrat takes place during the implementation process when the issue at stake becomes politicised. We test our argument through the analysis of the Glyphosate renewal procedure (2015-2017). We process-trace the case by means of semi-structured interviews, media and document analysis. We find that with the increase of issue visibility and subsequent politicisation, the Commission progressively abandons a purely technocratic behaviour. First, it puts in place political strategies such as delays and blame-shifting to release itself from the burden of unpopular decisions. Secondly, it seeks to respond to concerns expressed by consumers by proposing compromise-based measures closer to public interest. Ultimately, we show how the outcome of the policy process is mediated by politicisation and characterised by a shift from technocratic to responsive decision making.

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“…Specifically, how does one find out the spatial dimension or dimensions in terms of which the connected coalitions can subsequently be defined? Steunenberg et al (1999) suggest an approach to power measurement thatalthough similar in spirit to the one proposed by Garret and Tsebelis -runs directly counter with their injunction not to assume random distribution of policy preferences of players. 39 In fact, Steunenberg et al go one step further than the classic power indices in assuming not only that the player coalitions or -in the case of the Shapley-Shubik index -player permutations are equiprobable, but that all states of the world are equally probable.…”

Section: Power and Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Models of Political Economy

Nurmi¹

2006

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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business For my mother Contents List of Figures xi List of Tables xiii Preface xv Notes Bibliography Name Index Subject Index List of Figures 2.1 Easton's political system view 4.1 The preference reversal experiment 4.2 Valuation of gains and losses according to prospect theory 4.3 Compromise effect 4.4 Asymmetric domination 5.1 UN game in extensive form 5.2 Reduced UN game in extensive form 5.3 Chicken game in extensive form 5.4 Chain store game in extensive form 6.1 Two-person bargaining 6.2 Is independence plausible? 6.3 The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 7.1 The successive agenda 7.2 The SEs of department X chair agenda 8.1 External and decision-making cost functions xvi Preface role was played by Tommi Meskanen, who not only checked the more technical parts of the text but also devised the algorithms for computations reported in section 6.4. My research associates Juha Helin, Elina Kestilä and Maria Suojanen have carefully read the manuscript and suggested several improvements. Some parts of the manuscript were also commented upon by Antti Pajala. I am also grateful to Rob Langham and Terry Clague of Routledge for encouragement and support. The work on this project was made possible by my former and present employer, University of Turku and Academy of Finland, respectively.

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Strategic Power in the European Union

Cited by 124 publications

References 45 publications

Stubbornness, Power, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Multiple Equilibria

Stubbornness, Power, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Multiple Equilibria

Expertise, politics and public opinion at the crossroads of the European Commission’s decision-making: The case of Glyphosate.

Models of Political Economy

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