Models of Political Economy

Abstract

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business For my mother Contents List of Figures xi List of Tables xiii Preface xv Notes Bibliography Name Index Subject Index List of Figures 2.1 Easton's political system view 4.1 The preference reversal experiment 4.2 Valuation of gains and losses according to prospect theory 4.3 Compromise effect 4.4 Asymmetric domination 5.1 UN game in extensive form 5.2 Reduced UN game in extensive form 5.3 Chicken game in extensive form 5.4 Chain store game in extensive form 6.1 Two-person bargaining 6.2 Is independence plausible? 6.3 The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 7.1 The successive agenda 7.2 The SEs of department X chair agenda 8.1 External and decision-making cost functions xvi Preface role was played by Tommi Meskanen, who not only checked the more technical parts of the text but also devised the algorithms for computations reported in section 6.4. My research associates Juha Helin, Elina Kestilä and Maria Suojanen have carefully read the manuscript and suggested several improvements. Some parts of the manuscript were also commented upon by Antti Pajala. I am also grateful to Rob Langham and Terry Clague of Routledge for encouragement and support. The work on this project was made possible by my former and present employer, University of Turku and Academy of Finland, respectively.

Implementation of Mining Affairs in Palu City from a Political Economy Perspective

“…This can be seen in the government regulation on minerals and coal which says "Community mining permit, hereinafter referred to as IPR, is a permit to conduct mining business in community mining areas with a limited area and investment", this shows that there is flexibility in making regulations in the regency regional governments. In the interest of healthcare, which will of course have implications politically and economically for the right to levy taxes (PAD) [17].…”

“…Since it is quite relevant in the framework of the political economy, which consists of the context, activities, trends and models / forms of decisions / policies, as the political economy will center its attention on the fundamental study of decision-making [17] and take into account the opinion of Ghosh and Guv (2006) that "Globalization has contaminated expanded income disparity [14]." In order to escape the detrimental effects of globalization, propose a hybrid (mixed) macroeconomy between the private sector and policy planning focused on market regulation democratization and government interference (state) structured to avert market collapse.…”

Voting Power and Procedures

“…For instance, an agent may support his favored alternative by voting for another alternative or by not voting at all. Nurmi (1999Nurmi ( , 2006) contain a collection of such "paradoxes". These paradoxes tell us that we cannot derive the contribution of an individual to a particular collective action from the individual's voting behavior.…”

Power Sharing in Politics

“…For instance, an agent may support his favored alternative by voting for another alternative or by not voting at all. Nurmi [1999Nurmi [ , 2006 contains a collection of such "paradoxes". These paradoxes tell us that we cannot derive the contribution of an individual to a particular collective action from the individual's voting behavior.…”