Strategic policy failure and governance in Sierra Leone

Abstract

The brutal nine-year conflict in Sierra Leone has defied both military solutions adopted by various governments and peace accords imposed by the international community and regional powers. The latest casualty is the controversial Lome! Accord, which gave power and amnesty to the rebels in a power-sharing government. This article offers explanations for the failures by focusing on the interplay between the policy choices of decision-makers and the country's governance institutions and social structure. The policies of decision-makers can have negative consequences on societies if they are grounded on institutions that are at variance with a country's social structure. The article develops three main arguments to support this conclusion. First, the country's bipolar ethnic structure and majoritarian presidential system of government act as serious constraints on policies that seek to forge a national coalition to end the war. Second, conventional armies in ethnically polarised settings are a poor instrument for fighting rebel groups that deliberately use mass abductions and terror as war strategies. Third, peacemakers do not understand the institutional contexts in which violence-prone rebel groups can be made to reclaim their humanity and observe peace agreements. The logic of the interconnections between territory, resources and civilisation suggests that Sierra Leone's rebels are unlikely to accept disarmament and honour the democratic road to peace.

“A Great Scholar is an Overeducated Person”

“…The Ministry of Youth and Sports, Government of Sierra Leone (2003) advocated returning young people to the classroom in order to render "marginal" and "war-affected" youth "mainstream." Researchers have argued that the government's rustication of its erstwhile intelligentsia in the 1970s precipitated the formation of the Revolutionary United Front and thus contributed to the ten-year-long civil war (Abdullah 1998;Bangura 2000;Rashid 2004;Richards 1996), stating that the government's poor treatment of the educated contributed to revolutionary fervor: an extreme form of leveling. The fear was that these revolutionary youth would continue to destabilize the country unless they were given tempting alternatives in the formal economy.…”

Transitional Justice, States of Emergency and Business as Usual in Sierra Leone

“…According to some observers (Bangura, : 560; Kandeh, : 175; Keen, : 220), the treason trials against alleged AFRC supporters and the execution of the twenty‐four soldiers were perceived as deepening ethnic and political divisions between northerners, who dominated the army, and people from the southeast, where the SLPP government enjoyed most support. The TRC report suggests that the execution of the soldiers alienated the RUF and the AFRC leadership from the government in Freetown and contributed to their decision to launch a counter‐offensive in December 1998 that culminated in the attack on Freetown in January 1999 (TRC, : 315–16).…”

Using Power-Sharing to Win a War: The Implementation of the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone

“…During the first months of 1999 Kabbah and Sankoh met regularly. 13 In addition, both the RUF/AFRC alliance and the government held consul-12 In April 1999 70% of Sierra Leone's territory was outside government control and the main highway leading from Freetown to the rest of the country was under RUF control (Bangura 2000). 13 Sankoh had been sentenced to death for his role in the 1997 coup and was appealing against the sentence from prison in Freetown.…”