Strategic Dynamics of Crisis Stability in South Asia

Abstract

In contrast to the pervasive confidence that the development of nuclear weapons ensures peace and stability by making wars too expensive to fight for, South Asian strategic stability has drifted into nasty security competition through arms race with an episodical crisis that continues at the sub-conventional level. Deterrence studies that were relegated to the bins of history soon after the end of the Cold War received a renewed interest of scholars on the subject since the demonstration of deterrent capabilities by South Asian rivals in 1998. A new wave of deterrence studies has developed in the current multipolar world with some scholars adopting Cold War models of analysis in the contemporary realms of South Asia, whereas other are attempting new analytical approaches. This article aims to offer a fresh look at how to provide a clear concept of strategic stability, how strategic stability is applicable in contemporary South Asia and what the recent crisis between India and Pakistan being interwoven with terrorism tells us about crisis stability between the two countries under the shadows of nuclear weapons.

Challenges of Nuclear Deterrence Stability in South Asia

“…It requires avoiding escalating the conventional crisis to the nuclear level to beat the adversary. It is worth noting that crisis stability is considered high when the incentives to strike first are very low for both the parties involved in the conflict (Ali and Sidhu, 2021). Dean Wilkening (1989) notes that the “nuclear crisis instability refers to the pressure both sides may feel during a crisis to launch the first strike in the hope of producing a more favorable outcome to what seems an inevitable nuclear war.”…”

“…At the same time, the second event took place 5 months later when an Indian military basecamp was attacked in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 34 and injuring more than 50, including women and children (Coll, 2006). These two events instantly brought India and Pakistan crises to their peak, collectively known as Twin-Peaks Crisis (Ali and Sidhu, 2021). During 10-month-long twofold mobilizations, India demanded the end of acts of terrorism allegedly supported by Pakistan and the hand-over of leading militants.…”

“…India claimed to have killed a “large number of JeM terrorists,” which the international media found untrue (Hashim, 2019). In response to IAF airstrikes, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched a counterstrike very next day and shot down an Indian Su-30 MKI while employing JF-17 Thunders and Retrofit of Strike Elements (ROSE) Mirage III and V in addition of using F-16, AWACS, and other electronic warfare systems for the provision of necessary support to cover Pakistani aircrafts (Ali and Sidhu, 2021). The crisis was defused with the return of the captured Indian pilot Wing Commander Abhinandan at Attari-Wagah Border after a short period of his captivity in Pakistan.…”

“…The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir region to which both India and Pakistan lay claim has become the casus belli for all crises and wars. The jittery situation on the Line of Control (LOC) that divides the disputed region has every possibility that any problem may escalate into a war that may result in an exchange of nuclear weapons (Ali and Sidhu, 2021). Pakistan claims over Kashmir as its "juggler vein," and its policymakers have categorically rejected the division of Jammu and Kashmir and alleged that India annexed this territory with highhandedness and deception.…”

“…Nevertheless, there exists an excellent body of deterrence pessimist scholarship that holds that the nuclear weapons are actual destabilizing factor, providing incentives for initiating a lower-level conflict which might escalate to the nuclear level (Ali and Sidhu, 2021). The perspective based on the assumptions of the deterrence optimists suggests that even a large-scale conventional war will not escalate to a nuclear level under the nuclear umbrella.…”