Strategic divide and choose

Nicolò, Antonio; Yu, Yan

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.006

Cited by 23 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Chen et al (2013) also design a more intricate deterministic strategyproof envy-free algorithm for piecewise uniform valuation functions, which is generalized by Aziz and Ye (2014); under the same assumption, Maya and Nisan (2012) give a characterization of strategyproof, Pareto-efficient cake cutting algorithms. Nash equilibria of cake cutting algorithms are studied by Nicolò and Yu (2008) and Brânzei and Miltersen (2013).…”

Section: Bibliography and Further Readingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cake Cutting Algorithms

Procaccia

2016

Handbook of Computational Social Choice

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Section: Bibliography and Further Readingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cake Cutting Algorithms

Procaccia

2016

Handbook of Computational Social Choice

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“…But other profiles are also PO in this sense. There are multi-stage variants of Ultimatum where players take turns proposing divisions of the resource (Nicolò and Yu, 2008), with players exchanging roles as determined by a third party controlling the experiment (Cason and Mui, 1998).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Give and Take Game: Analysis of a Resource Sharing Game

Mariano

Correia

2015

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We analyse Give and Take, a multi-stage resource sharing game to be played between two players. The payoff is dependent on the possession of an indivisible and durable resource, and in each stage players may either do nothing or, depending on their roles, give the resource or take it. Despite these simple rules, we show that this game has interesting complex dynamics. Unique to Give and Take is the existence of multiple Pareto optimal profiles that can also be Nash equilibria, and a built-in punishment action. This game allows us to study cooperation in sharing an indivisible and durable resource. Since there are multiple strategies to cooperate, Give and Take provides a base to investigate coordination under implicit or explicit agreements. We discuss its position in face of other games and real world situations that are better modelled by it. The paper presents an in-depth analysis of the game for the range of admissible parameter values. We show that, when taking is costly for both players, cooperation emerges as players prefer to give the resource.

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“…For two players, this is the familiar "divide and choose" method, where one player cuts the cake, and the other gets to choose (Brams andTaylor, 1996, Robertson andWebb, 1998). For three or more players this is a little more complex, but strategies for both exact and approximate solutions exist (Nicolò and Yu, 2008).…”

Section: Insights From Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…they ought to make people happy enough), they are not necessarily equitable in terms of equal utility: each stakeholders subjective valuation of their own piece is not necessarily equal to the others' own subjective valuation of their respective pieces (Nicolò and Yu, 2008). These issues can be illustrated by the simple two player cut and choose method: when the other players preference is not known, then this will result in a solution in which each player gets at least 50% of their perceived total value of the cake.…”

Section: Insights From Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These issues can be illustrated by the simple two player cut and choose method: when the other players preference is not known, then this will result in a solution in which each player gets at least 50% of their perceived total value of the cake. However, if the other players preference is known, then the result may not be a 1:1 division -if one player has a large appetite for cake and the other is watching their weight, then a 1:1 solution is not necessarily optimal, efficient, nor equitable, even if it is envy-free (Nicolò and Yu, 2008).…”

Section: Insights From Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Trading carbon, biodiversity, and livelihoods: a landscape scale analysis of ecosystems services and trade-offs in land-use policy

Law¹

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Conservation and economic paradigms are shifting in recognition of the interdependencies among environmental, economic, and social systems. This shift is changing philosophies on why, where, and how we conserve nature. In this thesis I develop and apply novel approaches to plan for diverse objectives with the goal of enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, and equitability of landscape management for multiple stakeholders.Forest carbon policy epitomises the challenges of interdependent environmental, economic, and social concerns. The ideals of REDD+ are inherently appealing, but in practice it presents a minefield of vagaries, unintended consequences, and trade-offs. Current forest-carbon policy fails to reflect the multiplicit social values of different management actions. As a solution, in chapter 2 I propose a policy framework that distinguishes distinct outcomes, promotes more effective incentives by better reflecting and leveraging from stakeholder values, and allows faster adaptation of policy to an uncertain future.Chapters 3-7 of my thesis develop a case study in a REDD+ priority region, the Ex-Mega Rice Project (EMRP) of Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. Restoration and development of the EMRP is of global interest due to substantial carbon emissions from degraded peatland, charismatic biodiversity, and a rapidly developing palm-oil industry. Understanding spatial distributions of environmental values is needed for their sustainable management. However, different stakeholders often perceive these values in different ways. In chapter 3, I explore the carbon, biodiversity, and development implications of seven proxies for carbon dynamics. I find above-ground biomass is not an adequate surrogate for emission dynamics, and current regulation limiting development on peatland may fail to incentivise peatland restoration. My results highlight that the most appropriate carbon proxy may not be the most accurate one, but rather the one that best incentivizes positive actions in suitable locations.REDD+ landscapes need to be managed for multiple social, economic, and environmental goals.In chapter 4 I quantify and map key policy-relevant ecosystem-service values, and evaluate the expected outcomes of four future land-use scenarios in the EMRP. I find that the prospective landuse plans will be considerable improvements on current land use, but identify several potential trade-offs. For example, oil-palm development may push smallholder agriculture into lowproductivity areas, and negatively impact biodiversity and carbon outcomes. This highlights that for effective, efficient, and equitable management these local-scale trade-offs will need to be carefully considered in future land-use planning for the EMRP.Estimating potential outcomes of different land-use policies can highlight where we may anticipate conflicts. Land-sharing and land-sparing strategies are embodied in agricultural and iii environmental policies currently applied in landscapes worldwide, and their relative benefits and shortcomings have rece...

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Strategic divide and choose

Cited by 23 publications

References 16 publications

Cake Cutting Algorithms

Cake Cutting Algorithms

The Give and Take Game: Analysis of a Resource Sharing Game

Trading carbon, biodiversity, and livelihoods: a landscape scale analysis of ecosystems services and trade-offs in land-use policy

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