Stop Interrupting: An Empirical Analysis of the Implementation of IMF Programs

Institutional Quality, Macroeconomic Stabilization and Economic Growth: A Case Study of IMF Programme Countries

“…Also civil liberties holds a negative consequence (though insignificantly) for prolonged users. Arpac et al (2008), for instance, indicated that trade openness helped in improving the implementation record of IMF programmes. In the current study, it can be seen that an improvement in KOF index of globalization significantly reduces MII in both the subgroups, highlighting the importance of openness here (as was in the case of its impact on real GDP).…”

“…Moreover, Arpac et al (2008) suggested to IMF to focus on domestic politics also while forming expectations about the e xtent of programme implementation in a country. At the same time, Nsouli et al (2004) pointed out that most research on gauging impact of Fund programmes did not take into account the underlying role of institutional quality in programme success rate.…”

“…At the same time, it has been pointed out that too much focus of the IMF on the demand side of the economy, at the cost of supply side, has led to the impact of IMF progra mmes at most being neutral (and in some countries even negative) on economic growth of programme countries (Haque and Khan, 1998;Bird, 2001;Bird, 2007;Arpac et al, 2008). NIE (New Institutional Economics) literature, on the other hand, indicates that countries which saw improvement in institutional quality, also witnessed their per capita incomes improving (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005;Afonso and Jalles, 2011).…”

Determinants of Institutional Quality: A Case Study of IMF Programme Countries

“…On the other hand, Fund programs have been criticized for focusing too much on initiatives to reduce aggregate demandcurtailment of investment more than boosting savings to overall reduce absorption to deal with macroeconomic imbalances, while it has not pushed that much on improving the supply side -to bring economy to an equilibrium which reflects its true potential; in turn hurting economic growth in many programme countries (Haque and Khan, 1998;Bird, 2001;Bird, 2007;Arpac et al 2008). …”

And the first shall be the last

“…Here the earlier Hungarian experience of introducing markets under single party rule. In other instances experiences transcending the usual stabilization and structural adjustment packages of the IMF (Arpac et al, 2008;Eke and Kutan, 2009) might be of interest. In other words, some of the postcommunist experience may well be generalized for being relevant for transitions in other parts of the globe.…”