Abstract:SUMMARYAutonomous aerial vehicles play an important role in military applications such as in search, surveillance and reconnaissance. Multi-player stochastic pursuit-evasion (PE) differential game is a natural model for such operations involving intelligent moving targets with uncertainties. In this paper, some fundamental issues of stochastic PE games are addressed. We first model a general stochastic multi-player PE differential game with perfect state information. To avoid the difficulty of multiplicity of … Show more
“…Otherwise, the Recognizer flags the suspected target and calls in the Interceptor. We do not describe in detail the "pursuer-evader game" (see for example [34][35][36]) that may take place after an object is flagged and make the simplifying assumption that once flagged, the object remains stationary at its location until the arrival of the Interceptor. This assumption simplifies considerably the model while affecting only marginally the operational reality because of the different time scales of airborne and surface vehicles.…”
Abstract. Interdiction operations involving search, identification, and interception of suspected objects are of great interest and high operational importance to military and naval forces as well as nation's coast guards and border patrols. The interdiction scenario discussed in this paper includes an area of interest with multiple neutral and hostile objects moving through this area, and an interdiction force, consisting of an airborne sensor and an intercepting surface vessel or ground vehicle, whose objectives are to search, identify, track, and intercept hostile objects within a given time frame. The main contributions of this paper are addressing both airborne sensor and surface vessel simultaneously, developing a stochastic dynamic-programming model for optimizing their employment, and deriving operational insight. In addition, the search and identification process of the airborne sensor addresses both physical (appearance) and behavioral (movement pattern) signatures of a potentially hostile object. As the model is computationally intractable for real-world scenarios, we propose a simple heuristic policy, which is shown, using a bounding technique, to be quite effective. Based on a numerical case study of maritime interdiction operations, which includes several representative scenarios, we show that the expected number of intercepted hostile objects, following the heuristic decision policy, is at least 60% of the number of hostile objects intercepted following an optimal decision policy.
“…Otherwise, the Recognizer flags the suspected target and calls in the Interceptor. We do not describe in detail the "pursuer-evader game" (see for example [34][35][36]) that may take place after an object is flagged and make the simplifying assumption that once flagged, the object remains stationary at its location until the arrival of the Interceptor. This assumption simplifies considerably the model while affecting only marginally the operational reality because of the different time scales of airborne and surface vehicles.…”
Abstract. Interdiction operations involving search, identification, and interception of suspected objects are of great interest and high operational importance to military and naval forces as well as nation's coast guards and border patrols. The interdiction scenario discussed in this paper includes an area of interest with multiple neutral and hostile objects moving through this area, and an interdiction force, consisting of an airborne sensor and an intercepting surface vessel or ground vehicle, whose objectives are to search, identify, track, and intercept hostile objects within a given time frame. The main contributions of this paper are addressing both airborne sensor and surface vessel simultaneously, developing a stochastic dynamic-programming model for optimizing their employment, and deriving operational insight. In addition, the search and identification process of the airborne sensor addresses both physical (appearance) and behavioral (movement pattern) signatures of a potentially hostile object. As the model is computationally intractable for real-world scenarios, we propose a simple heuristic policy, which is shown, using a bounding technique, to be quite effective. Based on a numerical case study of maritime interdiction operations, which includes several representative scenarios, we show that the expected number of intercepted hostile objects, following the heuristic decision policy, is at least 60% of the number of hostile objects intercepted following an optimal decision policy.
“…The increasing use of autonomous assets in modern military operations has recently led to renewed interest in Pursuit-Evasion (PE) differential games (Hespanha et al [2000], Schenato et al [2005], Li and Cruz [2006], Li et al [2008]). The PE problem is usually formulated as a zerosum game, in which the pursuer(s) tries to minimize a prescribed cost functional while the evader(s) tries to maximize the same functional (Isaacs [1965], Başar and Olsder [1998]).…”
“…In the literature most of the studies on the multiplayers differential games are concentrated on the multiple pursuers and evaders scenario. In [39,40] a hierarchical approach to multiplayer pursuit evasion differential game with two dimensional dynamic is presented. In [9] a hierarchical approach is presented where some evaders' capability are higher than those of all pursuers in the engagement.…”
Section: Chapter 5 Multiplayer Game In Orbitmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An optimized sequential approach for the multiplayer game is in [33]. Different solutions are find in [37,38,42,44] for zero sum differential game.…”
Section: Chapter 5 Multiplayer Game In Orbitmentioning
One of the main challenges for autonomous spacecraft relative guidance and control is extending the algorithms for autonomous rendezvous and docking (AR&D) operations to multiple collaborative spacecraft.In this thesis, the autonomous rendezvous problem, between two active spacecraft, is formulated as a two player nonzero-sum differential game. The local-vertical local-horizontal (LVLH) rotating reference frame is used to describe the dynamic of the game.The State-Dependent Riccati equation (SDRE) method is applied to extend the Linear Quadratic differential game theory to obtain a feedback control law for nonlinear equation of relative motion. In the simulations both the spacecraft use continuous thrust engines. A comparison among Pareto and Nash equilibrium has been performed.A multiplayer sequential game strategy is used to extend the control law to many spacecraft for relative motion synchronization in an on-orbit self assembly strategy.
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SommarioUno dei possibili sviluppi della guida e del controllo relativo nello spazio è quella di estendere gli algoritmi per operazioni di rendezvous e di docking autonome a più veicoli spaziali che collaborano tra di loro. Il problema del rendezvous tra due veicoli spaziali viene risolto utilizzando la teoria dei giochi differenziali lineari quadratici. La dinamica del gioco viene descritta in un sistema di riferimento cartesiano non inerziale.Per estendere l'utilizzo della teoria dei giochi differenziali lineari quadratici alle equazioni non lineari di moto relativo è stata utilizzata le tecnica di parametrizzazione in funzione dello stato o linearizzazione estesa. Nelle simulazioni è stato valutato il confronto tra le prestazioni e le traiettorie ottenute con l'equilibrio di Pareto e quello di Nash quando entrambi i veicoli spaziali agiscono sotto spinta continua.Una strategia sequenziale è stata utilizzata per estendere il gioco differenziali a più di due giocatori per avere la sincronizzazione del moto relativo durante operazioni di assemblaggio nello spazio.3
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