State capture and development: a conceptual framework

Abstract

This article argues that the concept of state capture helps to structure our understanding of patterns of grand corruption seen around the world in varied contexts, and increasingly even in countries once regarded as secure democracies. This article seeks to lay the groundwork for future empirical research into state capture in three areas. First, it situates the concept within a wider literature on corruption and describes how it relates to other similar terms, including regulatory capture and kleptocracy. Second, it elaborates on three pillars of activity that are subject to capture, and a variety of mechanisms through which state capture occurs. This provides a structure for the gathering of evidence on how capture plays out in different cases, and raises questions about the interactions among mechanisms and variation in sequencing. Third, the paper considers the impact of state capture on economic and social development, by outlining the ways in which it skews the distribution of power and potential long-term consequences for the allocation of rights and resources.

Assessing the impact of wealth inequality on state capture in Latin America

“…However, I also account for public sector acts of corruption and state capture as well. Thereby providing a more encompassing measure of state capture overall that not only accounts for the skewing of the rules of the game but also acts of corruption and capture, both public and private, that take place after the rules have been skewed in favor of a certain group of people/economic sector (David-Barrett, 2021).…”

“…Institutional explanations for explaining the variation in state capture include the rule of law, the judicial apparatus, and the legislative branch. David-Barrett (2021) and Martini (2014) both note the importance of institutions in controlling state capture . If interest groups are able to take control of the institutions and processes that create public policy, they can thereby exclude other parts of the citizenry for which the institutions are supposed to serve (Hellman et al , 1999).…”

“…If interest groups are able to take control of the institutions and processes that create public policy, they can thereby exclude other parts of the citizenry for which the institutions are supposed to serve (Hellman et al , 1999). David-Barrett (2021) also notes that although state capture always entails collusion between political and business interests, the more that political leaders “drive” the process enables greater efficiency amongst captor groups to seize control of institutions that shape the rules of the game. It is important for captor actors to control institutions that shape the rules of the game, as such institutions can also inhibit captor actors’ ambitions.…”

“…It is important for captor actors to control institutions that shape the rules of the game, as such institutions can also inhibit captor actors’ ambitions. If they control them, however, captor actors can dismantle the accountability ecosystem (David-Barrett, 2021). Elites and captor actors, therefore, constantly seek to dismantle systems of accountability (Hellman et al , 2000a, 2000b).…”

“…Elites and captor actors, therefore, constantly seek to dismantle systems of accountability (Hellman et al , 2000a, 2000b). David-Barrett (2021) notes that institutions of accountability that are often targeted include the judiciary; law enforcement and prosecution; supreme audit institutions; the media; civil society organizations; and academia. In brief, disabling institutions of accountability eliminates the voice of minorities and disempowers the most disadvantaged (David-Barrett, 2021).…”