Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: an experimental study

Abbink, Klaus

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008

Cited by 190 publications

(143 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Primero, en juegos de coi ma similares (Abbink, 2004(Abbink, , 2005Abbink & Henning-Schmidt, 2006) y algunos no tan similares (Armantier & Boly, 2012;Frank & Schulze, 2000;Schulze & Frank, 2003).…”

Section: Estudios Experimentales Sobre Corrupciónunclassified

“…A su vez, se ha encontrado que la severidad del potencial castigo produce el efec to anti-corrupción esperado (Abbink et al, 2002;Barr & Serra, 2009;Schulze & Frank, 2003). Y, entre las extensiones novedosas de estos trabajos, se destaca la puesta a prueba de la técnica de rotación de perso-nal para desa lentar el establecimiento de confianza y reciprocidad corruptas: en un juego de coimas en el que los participantes eran re-emparejados al azar luego de cada ronda de juego, los niveles de transferencia de coimas, así como de elección de la opción corrupta por parte del segundo participante se vieron significativamente reducidos (Abbink, 2004). Un hallazgo interesante es que las mujeres parecen ser menos corruptas que los hombres o, al menos, responden mejor al monitoreo y riesgo de castigo (Armantier & Boly, 2012;Schulze & Frank, 2003).…”

Section: Estudios Experimentales Sobre Corrupciónunclassified

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Estudios experimentales sobre corrupción y el problema de la validez externa

Moro

Freidin

2012

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El estudio de la corrupción (causas, consecuencias y medios efectivos para combatirla) es difícil debido a la naturaleza usualmente secreta del tipo de relaciones involucradas. Recientemente se han comenzado a realizar estudios experimentales sobre situaciones análogas a las de corrupción para complementar otros abordajes empíricos más tradicionales. El problema principal que se ha planteado sobre estos estudios es el de su validez externa, es decir, si los resultados que se obtienen en el laboratorio son extrapolables a situaciones de corrupción reales. Los objetivos de este artículo son, por un lado, resumir la metodología y los principales resultados de esta nueva área de investigación y, por otro, analizar el problema de su validez externa. Se concluye que si bien algunos resultados son alentadores, parece aconsejable una actitud cautelosa con respecto a la generalización de los mismos. Consecuentemente, se sugiere la necesidad de realizar más estudios empíricos para evaluar la validez externa del área.Palabras clave: Corrupción; Toma de decisiones; Economía experimental; Validez externa. ABSTRACTSome authors conceive corruption as the misuse or abuse of public power for private benefit. Despite not being full agreement about the conceptual definition of the term, there is consensus that corruption is a widespread welfare-reducing phenomenon affecting insti tutions all over the world (Rose-Ackerman, 2006

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Section: Estudios Experimentales Sobre Corrupciónunclassified

Estudios experimentales sobre corrupción y el problema de la validez externa

Moro

Freidin

2012

Interd

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“…They cover issues like trust and reciprocity (Abbink et al, 2000Lambsdorff and Frank, 2007), moral cost of corruption (Abbink, 2002), deterrence versus intrinsic motivation (Schulze and Frank, 2003), staff rotation (Abbink, 2004), neutral versus loaded instructions (Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt, 2006), externality and framing effects (Barr and Serra, 2007), bribery and public procurement (Büchner et al, 2008), impact of parametric change (Krajčová, 2008), subject pool effects (Alatas et al, 2009), propensity to engage in and punish corruption , bribery, punishment, norms and reciprocity (Banuri and Eckel, 2009), culture and corruption (Barr and Serra, 2010), gender and corruption (Frank et al, 2011), and sensitivity to corruption (Geng and Hennig-Schmidt, 2011). Especially, Abbink et al (2000) shows that trust and reciprocation are sharply contrasted to equilibrium behavior.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery

Engel

Goerg

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing corruption. For this purpose, we designed and ran a lab experiment in Bonn (Germany) and Shanghai (China) with exactly the same design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially undesirable favor, while bribers are more likely to report to the authorities with asymmetric punishment. In addition, when punishment was asymmetric, corrupt offers were significantly more likely in Shanghai, but not in Bonn. Our results suggest a tradeoff between deterrence and law enforcement. In a forward-looking perspective, lawmakers must decide which aim carries more weight.

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“…They also show that negative externalities imposed by the briber on the society do not affect bribery and that tougher sanctions imposed on bribers if bribery is discovered reduce corruption at the extensive margin. Their paper has paved the way for numerous experiments that have shed light on the effects of staff rotation (Abbink, 2004), wages of public officials (Abbink, 2005;Van Veldhuizen, 2013) and culture (Barr and Serra, 2010;Cameron et al, 2009) on corruption, among others. 5 Four recent papers are linked to our study.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Cooperation

Buffat

Senn

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Corruption is a widespread phenomenon. Nevertheless, causal evidence on the effects of corruption is still lacking. In this paper, we assess whether and how corruption affects cooperation using a public good game experiment. Overall, contributions to the public good are reduced by 30% when participants have the possibility to bribe the punishment authority. Two concurrent channels lead to lower levels of cooperation. First, the punishment of low contributors decreases both at the intensive and the extensive margin. Second, bribery discourages initially high contributors, who gradually decrease their contributions down to the level of initially low contributors. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL CODES: C91, D73, K42

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Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: an experimental study

Cited by 190 publications

References 25 publications

Estudios experimentales sobre corrupción y el problema de la validez externa

Estudios experimentales sobre corrupción y el problema de la validez externa

Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery

Corruption and Cooperation

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