St. Augustine on Time, Time Numbers, and Enduring Objects

Abstract

Throughout his works, St. Augustine offers at least nine distinct views on the nature of time, at least three of which have remained almost unnoticed in the secondary literature. I first examine each these nine descriptions of time and attempt to diffuse common misinterpretations, especially of the views which seek to identify Augustinian time as consisting of an un-extended point or a distentio animi. Second, I argue that Augustine’s primary understanding of time, like that of later medieval scholastics, is that of an accident connected to the changes of created substances. Finally, I show how this interpretation has the benefit of rendering intelligible Augustine’s contention that, at the resurrection, motion will still be able to occur, but not time.

Ricoeur on time: From Husserl to Augustine

“…Only of the present can be said that it is an indivisible instant, pointlike, with no duration (Carter 2011:304 referring to De Musica (Augustinus Hipponensis [391] 1938. The only argument against the nonbeing of the past and future seems to be our experience, articulated in language, namely of what we say and do with regard to them.…”