Square Like Attack on Camellia

Duo, Lei; Li, Chao; Feng, Keqin

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-77048-0_21

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 15 publications

(161 reference statements)

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“…We guess every possible value of K L , for each guess, K B can be calculated by Equations (2) and (3), then sieve this (K L , K B ) pair by Equation (6). For the (K L , K B ) that satisfy Equation (6), further compute 64 bits of K A by Equation (5).…”

Section: Precomputationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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New Impossible Differential Attacks of Reduced-Round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256

Chen

Jia

et al. 2011

Information Security and Privacy

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Abstract. Camellia is a block cipher selected as a standard by ISO/IEC, which has been analyzed by a number of cryptanalysts. In this paper, we propose several 6-round impossible differential paths of Camellia with the F L/F L −1 layer in the middle of them. With the impossible differential and a well-organized precomputational table, impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 are given, and the time complexity are 2 175 and 2 206.8 respectively. An impossible differential attack on 15-round Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers and whitening is also be given, which needs about 2 236.1 encryptions. To the best of our knowledge, these are the best cryptanalytic results of Camellia-192/-256 with F L/F L −1 layers and Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers to date.

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Section: Precomputationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are a number of results on simple versions of Camellia which exclude the F L/F L −1 layers and whitening being given in recent years [6,10,13,14,16,17,18,19]. Among them, the impossible differential attacks [3] are most efficient [13,14,17,18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Impossible Differential Attacks of Reduced-Round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256

Chen

Jia

et al. 2011

Information Security and Privacy

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“…The security of Camellia was initially analyzed by the algorithm designers. Efficient attacks on Camellia include linear cryptanalysis [14] , differential cryptanalysis [13,14] , impossible differential cryptanalysis [15,17] , truncated differential cryptanalysis [7,9,15] , higher order differential cryptanalysis [5] , collision attack [16] and Square attack [3,19,20] . The best attacks on Camellia without FL/FL -1 function layer were impossible differential cryptanalysis [18] , which can attack 12-round Camellia-128 and 16-round Camellia-256 without FL/FL -1 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integral Attacks on Feistel-SP Structure Block Cipher

Li¹,

Wu²,

Zhang³

et al. 2013

Advances in Intelligent Systems Research

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Abstract-In this paper, a method is presented to extend the length of integral distinguisher of Feistel-SP structure, based on which a new 8-round distinguisher for the block cipher Camellia is proposed. Moreover, integral attacks on round-reduced Camellia without FL/FL -1 are improved. We attack 11-round Camellia-128 with the data complexity of 2 120 and the time complexity of 2 125.5 , and attack 12-round Camellia-256 with the data complexity of 2 120 and the time complexity of 2 214.3 . These attacks are the best integral attacks on round-reduced Camellia so far.

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“…As one of the most widely used block ciphers, Camellia has received a significant amount of cryptanalytic attention. The most efficient cryptanalytic results on Camellia include linear and differential attacks [19], truncated differential attack [5,10,13,20], higher order differential attack [7,11], collision attack [14,21], square attack [8,14,24], a square like attack [6] and impossible differential attack [15,20,22,23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced–Round Camellia–128

Mala

Shakiba

Dakhilalian

et al. 2009

Selected Areas in Cryptography

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Abstract. Camellia, a 128-bit block cipher which has been accepted by ISO/IEC as an international standard, is increasingly being used in many cryptographic applications. In this paper, using the redundancy in the key schedule and accelerating the filtration of wrong pairs, we present a new impossible differential attack to reduced-round Camellia. By this attack 12-round Camellia-128 without F L/F L −1 functions and whitening is breakable with a total complexity of about 2 116.6 encryptions and 2 116.3 chosen plaintexts. In terms of the numbers of the attacked rounds, our attack is better than any previously known attack on Camellia-128.

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Square Like Attack on Camellia

Cited by 17 publications

References 15 publications

New Impossible Differential Attacks of Reduced-Round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256

New Impossible Differential Attacks of Reduced-Round Camellia-192 and Camellia-256

Integral Attacks on Feistel-SP Structure Block Cipher

New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced–Round Camellia–128

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