Our current understanding of the neural basis of semantic memory is informed primarily by studies of concrete objects. However, conceptual knowledge encompasses many other, albeit less concrete, domains. This article reviews evidence from neuroimaging and patient studies that speaks to the neural basis of action concepts and the words that refer to them. These data highlight 2 important principles governing the neural instantiation of semantic knowledge. First, the organization of conceptual representations in the brain parallels perception and action. Action concepts are at least partially represented within modality-specific areas responsible for the perception and execution of dynamic actions. Second, unimodal sensory and motor cortices act as "points of entry" for more abstract action knowledge. Increasingly abstract conceptual knowledge derived from these modalities is represented in brain areas located anterior and centripetal to modality-specific regions. Extending research on the neural basis of semantics to include dynamic and relational aspects of the world gives us a more complete appreciation of the range of cognitive and communication impairments that may be experienced by patients with neurologic disease. Neurology How is knowledge about the world represented in the mind and brain? Most research on this knowledge, referred to as semantic memory, focuses on understanding objects, concrete entities that clearly correspond to verbal labels. Broadly speaking, 2 ways of thinking about the organization of semantic knowledge have emerged from studies of healthy and neurologically impaired participants. On one perspective, semantic representations exist within a unitary system. These representations are amodal and organized according to their relative similarities.1,2 Patients with semantic dementia who exhibit general semantic impairments across many tasks (e.g., naming, drawing) are taken as evidence for an amodal semantic system.2 Semantic dementia is associated with progressive focal atrophy of bilateral anterior temporal cortex, 3 an area of the brain with many connections to posterior association areas 4 and thereby proposed as the location of amodal conceptual representations of objects. 3 An alternative perspective posits that the semantic system is not unitary or amodal and instead consists of multiple subsystems that each represents information from different sensorimotor modalities.5 Conceptual knowledge of objects arises from the weighted contributions of these modality-specific subsystems. Neuropsychological data also support "sensory/functional" accounts, as evidenced by patients with "category-specific" semantic deficits who show disproportionate impairments for one category of objects. The most widely reported category dissociation is between living things (e.g., animals) 5 and nonliving things (e.g., tools, artifacts).
6By a sensory/functional account, our knowledge of living things is derived primarily from visual attributes (e.g., the shape or color of a camel), while our knowled...