Spontaneous Disorder in Adam Smith’sTheory of Moral Sentiments: Resentment, Injustice, and the Appeal to Providence

Observed without Sympathy: Adam Smith on Inequality and Spectatorship

“…Understanding the self‐doubt that can subsist alongside even a well‐developed impartial spectator is crucial to grappling with Smith's account of the psychological turmoil of the innocent man accused of a crime he did not commit. Yes, the innocent man feels “violent resentment” against the mistaken judges of his conduct, which he fails to satisfy (Schwarze and Scott 2015, 473). However, mistaken judgments of actual spectators also influence how the innocent man sees himself and the strength of the impartial spectator to whom he ought to appeal for consolation.…”

“…Smith intimates that God may be the only reliably sympathetic spectator; even the impartial spectator may fail. Smith suggests that religious faith that justice will be served at the end of his life provides the only reliable source of comfort to the wrongly judged individual (III.2.12, 120–21; III.2.32, 131–32; Schwarze and Scott 2015, 473–75). Even in the most extreme case, when a falsely convicted man faces execution, his dread of the undeserved loss of reputation that will outlive him seems more powerful than the fear of violent death itself (III.2.12, 119–20).…”

“…We may note such misperceptions in the beliefs espoused by Smith's contemporaries that he challenges in Wealth of Nations , but Theory of Moral Sentiments also offers numerous examples of spectators misperceiving people living in poverty. Smith's portrayals of spectators’ responses to people living in poverty exemplify his broader recognition that moral spectatorship inherently entails problems of misperception and failures of sympathy (Schwarze and Scott 2015, 473). Contrary to Smith's reputation as the progenitor of a liberal insensitivity to the problems of social coercion (Wolin 2004, 308), whose model of moral judgment is comparable to Michel Foucault's theory of the disciplinary power of surveillance (Foucault 1977; see also Forman‐Barzilai 2010; Peters 1995, 2010), Smith's moral philosophy provides the basis for an account of the harms of obligatory public exposure that centers on how the mistaken judgments of spectators demoralize even the most morally conscientious individuals.…”

From errors to OCBs and creativity: A multilevel mediation mechanism of workplace gratitude

“…Though not well-established yet, emerging research has, to some degree, shown that gratitude in the workplace could benefit not only the well-being of individuals but also that of organizations (Emmons 2003;McCullough et al 2001). Specifically, extant research has suggested that gratitude could help offset negative emotions and attitudes in the workplace (e.g., envy, greed, resentment; Michelle and John 2015), cultivate psychological safety and interpersonal trust, and promote employees' moral behaviors (e.g., prosocial behavior, voice, helping), which fuels organizational optimal and effective functioning and prompts organizations to thrive and prosper (Emmons 2003;Grant and Gino 2010;Hu and Kaplan 2015;Kim et al 2018;Müceldili et al 2015;Ng 2015).…”

Adam Smith on Philosophy and Religion

“…1 Much has been written over the last few years from each of these perspectives, but the focus in this discussion has always been on reading the passages where Smith discusses religious themes in an attempt to understand his views on religion. My basic position on this is to adopt a view on the terrain charted by , Schwarze and Scott (2015), and Heydt (2017). Such a position 1 A more sophisticated position is taken by Maria Carrasco, who argues that Smith's writings on religion are simultaneously explanatory and normative.…”