Observed without Sympathy: Adam Smith on Inequality and Spectatorship

Abstract

Responding to socioeconomic inequality and the decline of political participation, theorists of "audience democracy" emphasize citizens' spectatorship of political leaders but neglect how citizens experience being watched themselves. I turn to Adam Smith's arguments about the effects of inequality on spectatorship, highlighting his criticisms of the public's disdain for people living in poverty. By comparing Smith's arguments about misperceptions of people living in poverty to his discussions of an innocent man accused of a crime, I show how mistaken spectators demoralize even morally judicious individuals. I also expand on an example of unjust censure that Smith suggests but does not discuss in detail: the social shame directed at a survivor of rape. I conclude by using Smith's insights to reflect on the social and interpersonal dynamics of surveillance that render contemporary welfare programs degrading for many participants and help transform socioeconomic inequality into political inequality.

Egalitarian sympathies? Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy on inequality and social order

“…Smith's analysis of the distinction of ranks may be taken to illuminate an important aspect of what is wrong with inequality; namely, that inequality results in the poor being treated with neglect and disdain, depriving them of the sympathetic approbation of others that is required for happiness (see Collins, 2020, pp. 1036–1038; Hanley, 2009, pp.…”

“…Smith's views on equality have attracted considerable attention of late (see Fleischacker, 2013), with scholars seeking to recover his “radical egalitarianism” (McLean, 2006, p. 128), or commending his work as “a milestone in the history of egalitarianism.” (Anderson, 2016, p. 169) In particular, it has recently been argued that his analysis of inequality can enrich contemporary debates by showing how economic inequalities distort our sympathies and thereby undermine happiness and morality (Rasmussen, 2016). Viewed from this perspective, the account of sympathetic spectatorship set forth in TMS enables us to better understand and criticise the “social dynamics that shape the unjust scrutiny of people living in poverty and undergird political inequality” (Collins, 2020, p. 1044).…”

“…(Anderson, 2016, p. 169) In particular, it has recently been argued that his analysis of inequality can enrich contemporary debates by showing how economic inequalities distort our sympathies and thereby undermine happiness and morality (Rasmussen, 2016). Viewed from this perspective, the account of sympathetic spectatorship set forth in TMS enables us to better understand and criticise the "social dynamics that shape the unjust scrutiny of people living in poverty and undergird political inequality" (Collins, 2020(Collins, , p. 1044.…”

Beyond Self-Interest: Why the Market Rewards Those Who Reject It? by Krzysztof Pelc Oxford University Press, 2022

“…As Jamila Michener argues in her work on Medicaid, scholars and policymakers should listen to the experiences of those impacted by their policies and recognize how 'political processes fail to incorporate them as full and equal participants in American democratic practices'. 16 While I think the history of political and economic thought can help us consider how to critique and correct the paternalistic elements of public programs, 17 justifying social safety nets with 'secret knowledge' of their productivity gains risks continuing to create a dichotomy between people who deserve assistance and those who supposedly do not, long seen in the history of paternalism in public policy. 18 A more democratic approach to policymaking is particularly important in light of the increasing adoption of artificial intelligence by governments and private contractors alike.…”

Michelle Schwarze, recognizing resentment: Sympathy, injustice, and liberal political thought

“…Smith's moral psychology grappled with not only with "unsatisfied resentment" but also the frailty of resentment as a motivational force for holding the "rich and powerful" to account. While he was an incisive critic of many moral consequences of inequality (Rasmussen, 2016;Collins, 2020), Smith considered spectators' "obsequiousness" toward the "rich and powerful" the foundation of political order (Smith, 1982(Smith, [1759, p. 52). Some who reduce populism to "anti-elitism" may scoff at Smith's skepticism of the revolutionary force of resentment, but his claims resonate with the perplexing social status of many populist leaders.…”