Split-Ticket Voting: The Effects of Cognitive Madisonianism

Lewis‐Beck, Michael S.; Nadeau, Richard

doi:10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00143.x

Cited by 35 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Split-ticket voting has generated substantial interest in the discipline as demonstrated by the voluminous publication on the subject (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995;Bawn 1993Bawn , 1999Beck et al 1992;Born 1994;Brandy 1993;Cox 1990Duverger 1959;Feigert 1979;Fiorina 1996;Gallagher 1998;Garand and Lichtl 2000;Huang 2001;Huang, Chen, and Chou 2008;Jacobson 1991;Jesse 1988;Kohno 1997;Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2004;Reed 1999;Roscoe 2003). With a focus on electoral behavior in the United States where elections on executive and legislative bodies are held simultaneously, ticket-splitting is generally deined as a voting behavior where voters cast two or more than two ballots in an election to candidates of different parties competing for different positions.…”

Section: T Y Wang Chang-chih Lin and Yi-ching Hsiaomentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system-especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly-can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems and ind that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia.The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context-and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded. AcknowledgmentsThe genesis of this volume lies in an attempt to answer a basic research question that surfaced in a roundtable of the second annual Asian Election Studies Conference held at the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taiwan, in May 2010. Why was it that Taiwan and Japan, two similar East Asian countries that had both switched from similar single nontransferable vote to similar mixed-member majoritarian legislative electoral systems, had displayed such divergent speeds and degrees in moving toward the theoretically expected consolidation of their party systems? A brainstorm with Gary Cox during his visit to the ESC in November 2011 sparked the idea of taking into account the constitutional context in which the electoral systems operate.As with any book-length project, we have a number of people and institutions to thank. We thank the ESC and its director, Lu-huei Chen, for continuous administrative support throughout the life of the project. A book with twenty-one coauthors based in ifteen institutions spanning four countries needs some sort of institutional base, and the ESC provided that home. We also wish to acknowledge our four home institutions, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, National Chengchi University, the University of Canterbury, and Stanford University. ...

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Section: T Y Wang Chang-chih Lin and Yi-ching Hsiaomentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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“…The extent to which (and the reasons why) voters split their ballots is a central question in the voting behavior literature. Over the past two decades, scholars have expended substantial effort to comprehend better the circumstances under which split-ticket voting and divided government occur (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995;Beck et al, 1992;Burden and Kimball, 1998;Fiorina, 1996;Jacobson, 1990;Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2004;Roscoe, 2003). Conventional wisdom related to the potential increased party polarization over the past two decades (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998;Carsey and Layman, 2006;Jacobson, 2000;Layman and Carsey, 2002) suggests that the incidences of split-ticket voting and divided government should decline significantly, which raises interesting and important questions about why either might continue to prevail at such high rates.…”

Section: Ecological Inference and The Thomsen Estimatormentioning

confidence: 99%

Ecological inference under unfavorable conditions: Straight and split-ticket voting in diverse settings and small samples

2014

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“…The intuition behind the theory is fairly straightforward-some voters split their tickets simply because they prefer divided, but "balanced" government. In other words, a portion of voters tend to engage in intentionally, sophisticated voting behaviors (i.e., ticket splitting) to cause different partisan control of Congress and the presidency in order to ensure moderate policy (Alesina & Rosenthal, 1995; Carsey & Layman, 2001;Frymer, Kim, & Bimes, 1997;Lacy & Paolino, 1998;Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2004;Mebane, 2000;Smith, Brown, Bruce, & Overby, 1999). The balancing theory is appealing as it takes into account not only the policy differences between the two parties, but also the main feature of the US constitutionnamely, constant checks and balances due to the separation of powers purported by the nation's Founders.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Thus, some scholars also label the intentional model of sp lit-ticket Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research -ISSN 2288-6168 (Online) Vol. 2 No.3 May 2015: 196-227 http://dx.doi.org/10.15206/ajpor.2015 198 voting as the "cognitive-Madisonianism" model (Ladd, 1990;Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2004).In contrast, the unintentional model argues that voters split their votes mainly for other reasons (incumbency advantage, issue-ownership) rather than an intention for a divided government (Alvarez & Schousen, 1993;Born, 1994;Burden & Kimball, 1998;Garand & Lichtl 2000;Grofman, Koetzle, McDonald, & Brunell, 2000; Geer, Carter, McHenry, Teten, & Jennifer Hoef, 2004;Petrocik, 1991; Sigelman, Wahlbeck, & Buel l, 1997). Thus, the unintentional model does not predict a divided government but argues that such phenomenon could be simply an accident.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Who Wants Checks and Balances? Endogeneity of the Balancing Perspective

Huang²,

Hsiao³

2015

Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research

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The premise of the intentional model of split-ticket voting is that some voters split their tickets simply because they prefer divided government and believe in constant "checks and balances." This article examines whether this premise stands firm in an emerging democracy like Taiwan. That is, by using survey data in Taiwan, we explore whether one's attitude toward divided or unified government is "real." We hypothesize that a citizen's attitude toward "checks and balances" is subject to change, and conditional on whether her preferred party is in power. Specifically, we speculate that a citizen would tend to hold the balancing perspective or favor divided government, if her preferred party is in opposition. However, if her preferred party becomes the ruling party, she would be more likely to oppose (hold) the balancing (non-balancing) perspective or favor unified government. We then utilize panel survey data embedded in Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) to verify our hypothesis.Keywords: checks and balances; straight-and split-ticket voting; endogeneity 1 All correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Eric Chen-Hua Yu at Election Study Center & Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan or by email at ericyu@nccu.edu.tw. Research -ISSN 2288-6168 (Online) Vol. 2 No.3 May 2015: 196-227 http://dx.doi.org/10.15206/ajpor.2015 Asian Journal for Public Opinion 197The phenomenon of divided government has attracted considerable scholarly attention in the study of American politics over the past decades. One of the major controversies is its cause. While divided government is an aggregated result of certain voting patterns, scholars tend to develop micro-level theories to explain why voters caste their votes in those ways.In the context of American politics, a divided government is not unusual. Yet, unlike the periods of divided government in the late nineteenth century, during which divided government mainly occurred in off-year elections as the electorate changed the majority party in congressional elections, divided government in the post World War II period is driven by the rise of split-ticket voting in presidential elections-votes for one party for president and the other party for their members of Congress (Brady, 1993;Fiorina, 1992).As split-ticket voting appears to be a common practice for a portion of voters and can be regarded as the main cause of a divided government, then the question becomes why voters tend to do so.Empirical research purports two major models to explain split-ticket voting: the intentional and unintentional models. The intentional model of split-ticket voting mainly follows the logic of "balancing theory" argued by Fiorina (1992Fiorina ( , 1996. The intuition behind the theory is fairly straightforward-some voters split their tickets simply because they prefer divided, but "balanced" government. In other words, a portion of voters tend to engage in intentionally, sophisticated voting behaviors (i.e., ticke...

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Split-Ticket Voting: The Effects of Cognitive Madisonianism

Cited by 35 publications

References 15 publications

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Ecological inference under unfavorable conditions: Straight and split-ticket voting in diverse settings and small samples

Who Wants Checks and Balances? Endogeneity of the Balancing Perspective

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