Split Ticket Voting in Mixed Member Proportional Systems: The Hypothetical Case of The Netherlands

Gschwend, Thomas; Kolk, Hendrik van der

doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500150

Cited by 8 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…These results should also inform the ticket‐splitting literature. Ticket‐splitters act not necessarily strategically, but some of them do (Gschwend & Van der Kolk 2006). In contrast to the conventional wisdom, this analysis reveals that ticket‐splitters differ on several characteristics.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ticket‐splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany

Gschwend

2006

European J Political Res

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102

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Abstract. There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one's vote if one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote. They not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. Strategic voters employ either a wasted‐vote or a coalition insurance strategy, but do not automatically cast their vote for large parties as the current literature suggest. This has important implications for the consolidation of party systems. Moreover, even when facing the same institutional incentives, voters vary in their proclivity to vote strategically.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ticket‐splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany

Gschwend

2006

European J Political Res

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180

102

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“…As most voters cast straight-tickets, split-ticket voters are considered to require distinct information and incentives (Gschwend and Van der Kolk, 2006). In casting a split-ticket, individuals may be motivated by both partisan and strategic/contextual considerations.…”

Section: Split-ticket Voting In Mixed Electoral Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although it varies cross-nationally and over time, most voters cast a unified party ballot (Burden and Helmke, 2009; Gschwend and Van der Kolk, 2006; Schoen, 1999). And yet a significant minority do divide their vote across multiple parties, that is, engage in split-ticket voting (Burden and Helmke, 2009).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And yet a significant minority do divide their vote across multiple parties, that is, engage in split-ticket voting (Burden and Helmke, 2009). While some voters may split their tickets randomly (Schoen, 1999), most theories of split-ticket voting require either higher levels of political information or different motivations from straight-ticket voting (Gschwend and Van der Kolk, 2006). Given the relative rarity and the distinct motivations of the decision, examining split-ticket voters in different political contexts may reveal something important about voter decision-making.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Social Networks, Predispositions and Split-Ticket Voting: The Case of the 1990 German Unification Election

Leiter

2018

Political Studies

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When casting a split-ticket ballot, voters in established democracies have strong political predispositions and electoral experience that influence their decision. However, voters in a new democracy, lacking long-term party attachment and experience with democracy, may instead be informed and motivated by their social networks. Using the 1990 Cross-National Election Project German Unification study, I examine which factors predict split-ticket voting for East and West Germans. I find that political disagreement within a social network is more influential for East Germans, while partisan predispositions, particularly party supporter type, play a greater role for West Germans. These findings indicate that, in absence of competition between long-term partisanship and democratic experience, network characteristics may have a profound impact on political decision-making.

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“…Nevertheless, the extant scholarship focus only on sincere, strategic, coalitional, and voter confusion when examining voting behavior in mixed electoral systems (Gschwend and van der Kolk, 2006). This article examines whether Korean voters base their votes on retrospective evaluations more for party list vote choice than for district level vote choice.…”

Section: Voting Behavior In Mixed Electoral Systems: 2016 Korean Legimentioning

confidence: 99%

Comprehensive Retrospective Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems: Evidence from the 2016 Korean Legislative Election

Shin¹

2018

Japanese Journal of Political Science

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Performance-based retrospective voting is a fundamental mechanism of democracy. A good deal of scholarship has examined this electoral mechanism, but the extant studies have two omissions. First, there is little research that considers several retrospective evaluations together using an incumbent voting model. Second, there is little research that examines the difference in the effects of voters’ retrospective evaluations on two different ballots in mixed electoral systems. To fill these omissions, this article tests a comprehensive retrospective performance voting model in a mixed electoral system. Specifically, this article examines the effects of voters’ retrospective economic evaluations of economic performance at the national and personal levels, human rights, corruption, welfare protection, and foreign policy on vote choice for the incumbent party in the 2016 Korean legislative election in which voters had two ballots: one for the party list vote and one for the district vote. By using multinomial logistic regression models, this article finds that among the six retrospective evaluation categories, judgments of national economic performance at the national level, human rights, and foreign policy have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of voting for the incumbent party in party list vote choice, whereas only voters’ evaluation of foreign policy matter in the district level vote decision. The results imply that Korean voters consider various aspects of government performance, such as the conditions of human rights and relationships with other countries, rather than just focusing on the economy. The retrospective voting behavior of Korean voters differs between party list and district level ballots.

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Split Ticket Voting in Mixed Member Proportional Systems: The Hypothetical Case of The Netherlands

Cited by 8 publications

References 33 publications

Ticket‐splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany

Ticket‐splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: Evidence from Germany

Social Networks, Predispositions and Split-Ticket Voting: The Case of the 1990 German Unification Election

Comprehensive Retrospective Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems: Evidence from the 2016 Korean Legislative Election

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