2014
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12149
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Spinoza's Thinking Substance and the Necessity of Modes

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…It fits well with Spinozaʼs claim that the "order and connection" of causes is "one and the same" as that of "ideas" (E2p7); with his identification of "causes" and "reasons" (E1p11altd1); with his geometric models of causality, according to which things depend on God the way that a triangleʼs properties depend on its essence (e.g. E1p17s); and finally with his reliance on a single verb -to "follow [sequi]" -to describe both the dependence of propositions within his own arguments, and causal dependence within nature: it seems that things in Spinozaʼs nature causally "follow" from substance in the same way as propositions inferentially "follow" from one another in a demonstration.²³ Most logicising interpretations stop at simply asserting the existence of a correspondence or identity of causal relations and relations of entailment, without saying much about how precisely to understand this correspondence or identity, 20 On the relation between logic and psychology in Spinozaʼs philosophy see Bennett 1984, § 14, andHübner 2014. For the argument that the representative content of Spinozistic ideas cannot be causally efficacious, see Bennett 1984, § 51.5 21 Leibniz 1996, 1.1.…”
Section: Mechanism Logicism and Idealismmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…It fits well with Spinozaʼs claim that the "order and connection" of causes is "one and the same" as that of "ideas" (E2p7); with his identification of "causes" and "reasons" (E1p11altd1); with his geometric models of causality, according to which things depend on God the way that a triangleʼs properties depend on its essence (e.g. E1p17s); and finally with his reliance on a single verb -to "follow [sequi]" -to describe both the dependence of propositions within his own arguments, and causal dependence within nature: it seems that things in Spinozaʼs nature causally "follow" from substance in the same way as propositions inferentially "follow" from one another in a demonstration.²³ Most logicising interpretations stop at simply asserting the existence of a correspondence or identity of causal relations and relations of entailment, without saying much about how precisely to understand this correspondence or identity, 20 On the relation between logic and psychology in Spinozaʼs philosophy see Bennett 1984, § 14, andHübner 2014. For the argument that the representative content of Spinozistic ideas cannot be causally efficacious, see Bennett 1984, § 51.5 21 Leibniz 1996, 1.1.…”
Section: Mechanism Logicism and Idealismmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Substance has "two more properties: it must be modifiable and think". [21] I. Melamed, criticizing the idealism of M. Rocca and the German idealists, focuses on the problem of infinite modes, which he considers essential for understanding some of the most important doctrines of Spinoza's metaphysics, such as the flow of modes from the essence of substance, necessity, the whole-part relation and the nature of infinity.…”
Section: Materialism and Idealism In The Philosophy Of Spinozamentioning
confidence: 99%