The article first discusses some recent work in time perception-in particular the distinction among prospective timing, retrospective timing, and passage of time judgments. The history and application of an "internal clock" model as an explanation of prospective timing performance is reviewed and contrasted with the different mechanisms needed for the other two types of time judgments. The article then discusses two areas suggesting relations between time perception research and language. The first is the idea that disturbances in the perception of duration, usually of very brief auditory stimuli, are associated with some language disorders. Another is the common use of metaphors for time, and the article relates these to the issue of whether a genuine "time sense" exists.Language is certainly not necessary for organisms to show sensitivity to the temporal structure of their environment or even to adjust their behavior to quite arbitrary temporal periodicities or constraints imposed by experimenters. For example, in the Pavlovian "inhibition of delay" procedure, animals receive long presentations of a neutral stimulus (such as a bell or a tone), and when the stimulus terminates, food is delivered. Pavlov (1927) noted that the prototypical conditioned response of salivation eventually comes to be localized in the later parts of the stimulus; that is, the animal learns something about how long the bell or tone lasts. In later experiments by others, animals were rewarded with food for responses, like key-pecks and lever-presses, only at a certain time after