Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control

Benjamin, Stuart Minor

doi:10.2139/ssrn.424580

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Faulhaber and Farber (2003) and Hazlett (2001) acknowledge that a commons regime might work as long as spectrum is not scarce, but they also claim that demand growth will eventually lead to scarcity. From a slightly different perspective, Benjamin (2003) maintains that most of the technologies that might support the development of an open commons work just as well under a property rights regime given appropriate right assignments. In most situations, he claims, the ownership regime is superior in efficiency terms.…”

Section: A Brief Review Of the Recent Research Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing welfare for spectrum property and spectrum commons governance regimes

Ting

Wildman

Bauer

2005

Telecommunications Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: A Brief Review Of the Recent Research Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing welfare for spectrum property and spectrum commons governance regimes

Ting

Wildman

Bauer

2005

Telecommunications Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Xavier and Ypsilanti [24] addressed a number of potential benefits and costs that could hamper a spectrum trading market. Furthermore, many research [7,8,9,13,23] suggested adaptive and flexible spectrum management regimes that support market mechanisms. A particular form, and the most popular mechanism, is auctions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Secondary Spectrum Trading Mechanisms Based on Technical and Market Changes

Yoon

Hwang

Weiss

2010

2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum (DySPAN)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Due to the increase of spectrum demand, the value of spectrum resource has been increased and efficiency of spectrum usage has been important issues in the wireless industry. Therefore recently, there have been many efforts on changing spectrum management framework based on the market mechanism. This research analyzes three different mechanisms as an alternative of secondary trading framework; a brokerage mechanism, auctions and a direct trading. As a consequence, this research suggests an optimal framework for the secondary use trading based on the in-depth simulations which consider different attributes by technical characteristics and market changes and investigate economic values and competition environments.

show abstract

“…Whereas Faulhaber and Farber [8] and Hazlett [9] acknowledge that a commons regime might work as long as spectrum is not scarce, they also argue that demand growth will eventually lead to scarcity. Benjamin [1] contends that most of the technologies that would make possible the development of an open commons can work just as well under a property rights regime. In most situations, he claims a property rights regime is more efficient.…”

Section: A Review Of the Spectrum Policy Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Different flavors of both open commons and property rights regimes are determined by how the other two policy instruments considered in this study are set. 1 New America Foundation and Shared Spectrum Company (2003), "Dupont Circle Spectrum Utilization During Peak Hours". This survey found most of the spectrum blocks are underutilized under the current allocation.…”

Section: Spectrum Governance Regimes and Policy Instrumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the throughput model described in (1), both G and k can be exogenously specified without loss of generality, but SIR depends on both signal and effective interference strengths at the receiver, which are determined by several factors that are affected by the choices made by suppliers and/or policy makers. These factors include transmission power, spatial distance between receivers and transmitters, number of devices in use, spectral separation between systems, 3 and the robustness/quality of the receiver.…”

Section: B Factors Determining the Effect Of Interference On Utilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Government policy and the comparative merits of alternative governance regimes for wireless services

Ting

Wildman²,

Bauer³

First IEEE International Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, 2005. DySPAN 2005.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates the effects of policy instruments (entry restrictions, power limits and device robustness requirements) on welfare for two types of wireless networks (with and without backbone relay) through economic modeling. The study finds that (1) robustness requirements are undesirable; (2) the potential welfare improvement associated with power limits increases with the number of firms in the market; (3) when set inadequately, all three policy instruments can cause significant welfare loss; (4) comparison of a prototype property rights regime and a prototype commons regime suggests, given the same power restrictions, the property rights regime tends to outperform the commons regime as long as the number of firms is not significantly smaller (in relative terms) than the optimal number of firms, which itself is a small fraction of the open commons equilibrium number of firms.

show abstract

Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Comparing welfare for spectrum property and spectrum commons governance regimes

Comparing welfare for spectrum property and spectrum commons governance regimes

Research on Secondary Spectrum Trading Mechanisms Based on Technical and Market Changes

Government policy and the comparative merits of alternative governance regimes for wireless services

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About