Specifying and verifying hardware for tamper-resistant software

Lie, David; Mitchell, John C.; Thekkath, Chandramohan A.; Horowitz, Mark

doi:10.1109/secpri.2003.1199335

Cited by 62 publications

(68 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Step [1], row 2 and row 4 are modified causing contention and evictions from set 1 and 3 respectively. Consequently, an adversary can learn the identifier of the row being updated during each row operation by monitoring the address space in which any updates take place, and then linking it back to the row number.…”

Section: Attacking Mceliece Public-key Cryptosystemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Connecting the Dots: Privacy Leakage via Write-Access Patterns to the Main Memory

John

Haider

Omar

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.

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Abstract-Data-dependent access patterns of an application to an untrusted storage system are notorious for leaking sensitive information about the user's data. Previous research has shown how an adversary capable of monitoring both read and write requests issued to the memory can correlate them with the application to learn its sensitive data. However, information leakage through only the write access patterns is less obvious and not well studied in the current literature. In this work, we demonstrate an actual attack on power-side-channel resistant Montgomery's ladder based modular exponentiation algorithm commonly used in public key cryptography. We infer the complete 512-bit secret exponent in ∼ 3.5 minutes by virtue of just the write access patterns of the algorithm to the main memory. In order to learn the victim algorithm's write access patterns under realistic settings, we exploit a compromised DMA device to take frequent snapshots of the application's address space, and then run a simple differential analysis on these snapshots to find the write access sequence. The attack has been shown on an Intel Core(TM) i7-4790 3.60GHz processor based system. We further discuss a possible attack on McEliece public-key cryptosystem that also exploits the write-access patterns to learn the secret key.

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Section: Attacking Mceliece Public-key Cryptosystemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Numerous secure processor architectures (e.g., XOM [1], [2], TPM+TXT [3], Aegis [4], Intel-SGX [5] etc.) have been proposed for preserving data confidentiality and integrity during a remote secure computation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Connecting the Dots: Privacy Leakage via Write-Access Patterns to the Main Memory

John

Haider

Omar

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To the best of our knowledge, the closest related research project is the work of David Lie et al They have used a model checker (Murϕ) to model and verify the eXecute Only Memory (XOM) architecture [16]. The XOM architecture allows an application to run in a secure compartment wherein its data are protected against other applications and even a malicious operating system.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

SpecCert: Specifying and Verifying Hardware-Based Security Enforcement

Letan

Chifflier

Hiet

et al. 2016

FM 2016: Formal Methods

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Abstract. Over time, hardware designs have constantly grown in complexity and modern platforms involve multiple interconnected hardware components. During the last decade, several vulnerability disclosures have proven that trust in hardware can be misplaced. In this article, we give a formal definition of Hardware-based Security Enforcement (HSE) mechanisms, a class of security enforcement mechanisms such that a software component relies on the underlying hardware platform to enforce a security policy. We then model a subset of a x86-based hardware platform specifications and we prove the soundness of a realistic HSE mechanism within this model using Coq, a proof assistant system.

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“…All off-chip memory transactions have to pass through encryption and decryption processes providing a high level of security. Though the original proposal was susceptible to replay attacks, this problem can be addressed with relatively minor changes [25]. However, the main problem with XOM is its significant performance overhead since lengthy encryption and decryption processes reside on the critical path.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%