Special Relationships

Hahn, Peter L.

doi:10.1111/1467-7709.00116

Cited by 8 publications

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“…Historian Peter Hahn appraised this episode as marking 'the nadir in fifty years of US-Israeli relations', generating a bilateral crisis more severe than the one following Suez. 7 Eban was as baffled as Dulles by Ben-Gurion's decision. On return from the meeting he cabled Jerusalem: 'Our position is highly perplexing to them'.8 Three weeks later, his head of mission was still searching the foreign ministry for answers: 'To this day, those of us here cannot fathom why we went down that route',9 he wrote.…”

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Fortitude at stake: the accidental crisis in American–Israeli relations, August 1958

Schonmann

2017

Israel Affairs

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In the summer of 1958, the Middle East was engulfed in crisis, and the Eisenhower administration was rethinking its regional policy. Israel saw a chance to demonstrate its value as a reliable strategic partner by supporting the Western military operation to secure Jordan. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion authorized overflights and tabled proposals for a strategic partnership. Though Washington proved responsive, Ben-Gurion abruptly terminated the overflights, and a severe diplomatic crisis ensued. It was neither sought nor welcomed by the parties, and left all baffled and dismayed. Ben-Gurion's behaviour confounded contemporaries and historians: was he intimidated by Soviet threats? Did he yield to coalition pressures? Was he engaging in brinkmanship? New evidence shows that the root cause of the crisis was accidental, and ultimately it served only to cast doubt over Israel's fortitude.

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Fortitude at stake: the accidental crisis in American–Israeli relations, August 1958

Schonmann

2017

Israel Affairs

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Introduction

Xu¹

2017

Alliance Persistence Within the Anglo-American Special Relationship

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Israel's 1967 Governmental Debate about the Annexation of East Jerusalem: The Nascent Alliance with the United States, Overshadowed by “United Jerusalem”

Friesel¹

2016

Law hist. rev.

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“No Israeli, dove or hawk, will ever surrender any part of Jerusalem.”Arthur J. Goldberg, United States Ambassador to the United Nations 1965–68 The main position of modern international law prohibits the annexation of occupied territory. Israel, however, like Jordan two decades earlier, annexed East Jerusalem after its occupation in June 1967, and applied its national laws there. Although the legality of the Israeli move according to international law has been debated extensively ever since, the fact that in doing so Israel chose to act contrary to expressed American objections to this move has not been thoroughly examined, however. This research focuses on the Israeli governmental deliberations and eventual decision to annex East Jerusalem, against the backdrop of the early days of the emergence of a hesitant Israeli–American alliance following the 1967 War. Through an analysis of Israeli government meeting protocols, now released to the public, together with American and United Nations sources and existing scholarship, I aim to uncover what weight the United States objection to Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem held in the Israeli government's deliberations concerning whether or not to annex it.

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Special Relationships

Cited by 8 publications

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Fortitude at stake: the accidental crisis in American–Israeli relations, August 1958

Fortitude at stake: the accidental crisis in American–Israeli relations, August 1958

Introduction

Israel's 1967 Governmental Debate about the Annexation of East Jerusalem: The Nascent Alliance with the United States, Overshadowed by “United Jerusalem”

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