Speakers, Hearers and Demonstrative Reference

Leth, Palle

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-34485-6_5

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…On the non-referentialist view-defended by Bach (2006), Smit (2012), Heck (2014), Nowak (2016) and Leth (2020)-demonstratives have no semantically determined referent, even upon a typical occasion of use, and hence utterances that include them have no truth-evaluable, semantically determined propositional content. While demonstratives do have a linguistic meaning, this does not sufficeeven in a specific context of use-to determine semantic reference or content.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theory and Demonstratives

Smit

2023

Erkenn

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This paper argues, based on Lewis’ claim that communication is a coordination game (Lewis in Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 3–35, 1975), that we can account for the communicative function of demonstratives without assuming that they semantically refer. The appeal of such a game theoretical version of the case for non-referentialism is that the communicative role of demonstratives can be accounted for without entering the cul de sac of trying to construct conventions of ever-increasing complexity. Instead communication via demonstratives is explained with reference to the general, non-domain specific ability of human beings to solve games of coordination. Furthermore, there is empirical support for such a view. Judgments concerning demonstrative reference have been shown to be sensitive to judgments concerning common ground (Clark et al. in J Verb Learn Verb Behav 22:245–258, 1983), which is exactly what the non-referentialist account would predict. The game theoretical account also allows for an intuitively plausible, non-referentialist treatment of Speaks’ ‘trumping argument’ (Speaks in Philos Stud 174:709–734, 2017), as well as the Carnap/Agnew puzzle (Kaplan in Syntax Semant 9:221–43, 1970).

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theory and Demonstratives

Smit

2023

Erkenn

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“…The truth-conditional clause it makes would be analogous to that of strong intentionalism but it could not be treated as a version of strong intentionalism due to the fact that the determnination of the intended demonstratum is not purely subjective, Last but not least, the truth conditional analyses presented above are deliberatively simplified as the actual demonstratum (if there is one) does not have to be the referent of the corresponding demonstrative. In regular cases it has this status, but in the cases of deferred reference such as: 10 For a discussion regarding the role of intentions and demonstrations in truth conditional interpretation of demonstrative utterances, see Reimer (1991), Bach (1992), Roberts (1997), Perry (2009), King (2014), Radulescu (2019), and Leth (2020).…”

Section: Demonstrata: Potential Intended and Actualmentioning

confidence: 99%

Actions, Products, Demonstrations

Ciecierski¹

2023

OrgF

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As it is broadly accepted, typical uses of demonstratives are accompanied by demonstrations. The concept of demonstration, however, manifests the action-product ambiguity analogous to that visible in the opposition between jumping and the resulting jump, talking and the resulting talk or crying and the resulting cry. It is also a heterogeneous concept that enables demonstrations to vary significantly. The present paper discusses action-product ambiguity as applied to demonstrations as well as the heterogeneity of the latter. An account that acknowledges ambiguity and heterogeneity of demonstrations is sketched in the paper. It is argued that it has a rich explanatory and descriptive potential.

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Demonstrations as actions

Ciecierski

Makowski

2022

Synthese

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This paper presents a dual intention model (DIM) of demonstrations as actions to show the agentive nature of demonstrations. According to the DIM, demonstrations are complex actions that contain as components at least three elements: an abductive intention, a deictic intention, and a basic ostensive act of indication. This paper unpacks these three components and discusses their roles from the viewpoint of the philosophy of action and the philosophy of language. It also shows how the DIM applies in selected practical examples and explains the merits of the model in the context of other views on demonstrations and demonstratives.

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Speakers, Hearers and Demonstrative Reference

Cited by 3 publications

References 22 publications

Game Theory and Demonstratives

Game Theory and Demonstratives

Actions, Products, Demonstrations

Demonstrations as actions

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