Demonstrations as actions

Ciecierski, Tadeusz; Makowski, Piotr Tomasz

doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03942-1

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 52 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…If heterogeneity is true (and it is hardly controversial that it is), then one might ask what unifies varieties of possible actions making them exemplifications of demonstrations. One possible answer to this question is provided by the dual-intention model of demonstrations (Ciecierski & Makowski (2022)) according to which all demonstrations -as occurring in acts of communication 2 -are complex actions that have both an ostensive and an intentional profile.…”

Section: Two Profiles Of Demonstrationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Actions, Products, Demonstrations

Ciecierski¹

2023

OrgF

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As it is broadly accepted, typical uses of demonstratives are accompanied by demonstrations. The concept of demonstration, however, manifests the action-product ambiguity analogous to that visible in the opposition between jumping and the resulting jump, talking and the resulting talk or crying and the resulting cry. It is also a heterogeneous concept that enables demonstrations to vary significantly. The present paper discusses action-product ambiguity as applied to demonstrations as well as the heterogeneity of the latter. An account that acknowledges ambiguity and heterogeneity of demonstrations is sketched in the paper. It is argued that it has a rich explanatory and descriptive potential.

show abstract

Section: Two Profiles Of Demonstrationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Actions, Products, Demonstrations

Ciecierski¹

2023

OrgF

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Game Theory and Demonstratives

Smit

2023

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper argues, based on Lewis’ claim that communication is a coordination game (Lewis in Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 3–35, 1975), that we can account for the communicative function of demonstratives without assuming that they semantically refer. The appeal of such a game theoretical version of the case for non-referentialism is that the communicative role of demonstratives can be accounted for without entering the cul de sac of trying to construct conventions of ever-increasing complexity. Instead communication via demonstratives is explained with reference to the general, non-domain specific ability of human beings to solve games of coordination. Furthermore, there is empirical support for such a view. Judgments concerning demonstrative reference have been shown to be sensitive to judgments concerning common ground (Clark et al. in J Verb Learn Verb Behav 22:245–258, 1983), which is exactly what the non-referentialist account would predict. The game theoretical account also allows for an intuitively plausible, non-referentialist treatment of Speaks’ ‘trumping argument’ (Speaks in Philos Stud 174:709–734, 2017), as well as the Carnap/Agnew puzzle (Kaplan in Syntax Semant 9:221–43, 1970).

show abstract

A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’

Ciecierski

Rudnicki

2023

The Philosophical Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative.

show abstract

Demonstrations as actions

Cited by 3 publications

References 52 publications

Actions, Products, Demonstrations

Actions, Products, Demonstrations

Game Theory and Demonstratives

A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About