Spatial frequency content of visual imagery

Kunen, Seth; May, Julian

doi:10.3758/bf03198825

Cited by 24 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(12 reference statements)

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“…First, when subjects adapted to actual objects, their aftereffects were shown to be mediated by the fundamental spatial frequencies; in contrast, when visual images served as induction stimuli, the color aftereffects were mediated by higher spatial frequency components. These results are consistent with a previous study by Kunen and May (1980), who obtained similar adaptation patterns with imagery and actual stimuli under binocular viewing conditions. We suggested in that earlier study that when subjects generate their visual images, they construct them primarily from pattern information of which they are consciously aware.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 83%

“…This finding replicates previous reports regarding imagery-induced McCollough effects , '1978Kunen & May, 1980) and, in addition, shows that such effects can be obtained under adaptation conditions that do not give rise to traditional color aftereffects. With complete occlusion of the unused eye, no significant inter ocular transfer of color aftereffects was obtained when actual stimuli were used during adaptation.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 81%

“…We suggested in that earlier study that when subjects generate their visual images, they construct them primarily from pattern information of which they are consciously aware. Thus, although imagery and vision appear to represent information about the patterns based on different spatial frequency components, once the visual system receives that information it processes that information identically whether it comes from imagery or vision (see Kunen & May, 1980, Experiment 3, for further evidence on this issue). Second, the magnitude of the interocular transfer obtained with imagery is unaffected by whether the contralateral eye receives any stimulation, whereas interocular transfer with external stimulation occurs only if the contralateral eye receives some stimulation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The apparatus used is similar to that employed by Kunen and May (1980). The testing apparatus is schematized in Figure 1.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the most interesting recent developments regarding the establishment of pattern-contingent color aftereffects stems from the use of visual imagery during adaptation (Finke & Schmidt, 1977, 1978Kunen & May, 1980). In these investigations, subjects are asked to imagine different spatial patterns while they view actual nonpatterned chromatic fields.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Interocular transfer of orientation-contingent color aftereffects with external and internal adaptation

Kaufman

May

Kunen

1981

Perception & Psychophysics

Self Cite

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 83%

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 81%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The apparatus used is similar to that employed by Kunen and May (1980). The testing apparatus is schematized in Figure 1.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Interocular transfer of orientation-contingent color aftereffects with external and internal adaptation

Kaufman

May

Kunen

1981

Perception & Psychophysics

Self Cite

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Mental imagery: In search of a theory

2002

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It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons – for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the “null hypothesis”; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look.

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Loss of visual imagery: Neuropsychological evidence in search for a theory

Goldenberg

2002

Behav Brain Sci

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Observations on patients who lost visual imagery after brain damage call into question the notion that the knowledge subserving visual imagery is “tacit.” Dissociations between deficient imagery and preserved recognition of objects suggest that imagery is exclusively based on explicit knowledge, whereas retrieval of “tacit” visual knowledge is bound to the presence of the object and the task of recognizing it.

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Spatial frequency content of visual imagery

Cited by 24 publications

References 22 publications

Interocular transfer of orientation-contingent color aftereffects with external and internal adaptation

Interocular transfer of orientation-contingent color aftereffects with external and internal adaptation

Mental imagery: In search of a theory

Loss of visual imagery: Neuropsychological evidence in search for a theory

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