Spacetime the one substance

Schaffer, Jonathan

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9386-6

Cited by 136 publications

(115 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…I will now move to consider Lowe's objections. As I've already indicated, I will draw upon some more of the details of Schaffer's view, particular material that is developed in Schaffer's (2009). In various places, I also borrow from Lowe (1998Lowe ( , 2006Lowe ( , 2010 to show how relevant metaphysical notions can be brought to bear to solve the problems that Lowe himself raises.…”

Section: Monism=df (∃!X) Bxandbumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The view that Schaffer (2009) defends is that spacetime itself is a substance and, relatedly, that this substance is Monistic. There are two different parts of this thesis deserve our attention.…”

Section: The Spacetime-cosmosmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On this view there is no distinction between the container and the contained. (2009: 133) I don't mean to discuss (here) why he thinks that this is so; merely that Schaffer takes this view will be enough for our purposes (the interested reader is encourage to pursue Schaffer's (2009) rationale). We now have in-hand Schaffer's account of Monism as the thesis that spacetime is the one substance.…”

Section: The Spacetime-cosmosmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To this point, the focus of the paper has been showing that Schaffer's (2010) view can be defended from Lowe's attacks by making recourse to some of Lowe's own theoretical resources in conjunction with some of the remarks made in Schaffer (2009). Well and good.…”

Section: Overlapmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world

Tallant

2015

Philos Stud

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Section: Monism=df (∃!X) Bxandbumentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Spacetime-cosmosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Spacetime-cosmosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Overlapmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world

Tallant

2015

Philos Stud

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“…Ted Sider (2001) and Jonathan Schaffer (2009) both argue that endurantism is harmed by this transition. Their argument runs through two claims:…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime

Gilmore

2014

Synthese Library

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, eds., Mereology and the Sciences (volume under review at Springer, Synthese Library) Cody Gilmore Endurantism, the view that material objects are wholly present at each moment of their careers, is under threat from supersubstantivalism, the view that material objects are identical to spacetime regions. I discuss three compromise positions. They are alike in that they all take material objects to be composed of spacetime points or regions without being identical to any such point or region. They differ in whether they permit multilocation and in whether they generate cases of mereologically coincident entities. IntroductionLet me start with a rough characterization of two main views about persistence:Endurantism: At least some material objects persist through time; and every material object is temporally unextended and wholly present at each instant at which it exists at all. Moreover, it is not the case that every material object has a different instantaneous temporal part 1 at each different instant at which it exists.Perdurantism: At least some material objects persist through time; any every material object has a different instantaneous temporal part at each different instant at which it exists. Material objects that do persist are temporally extended and are at most partially present (not wholly present) at any one instant.I will introduce more carefully formulated views later on (from Gilmore 2006), but these are adequate for present purposes. Endurantism fits comfortably with presentism and certain other A-theorist of time.2 It also fits together fairly well with a certain brand of B-theoretic eternalism. What I have in mind here is a view like Newton's, according to which substantival space and substantival time are two separate and fundamental entities, and spacetime, if there is such a thing at all, is merely a construct of some sort. (Perhaps spacetime points are identified with ordered pairs.) Call this view about space and time 'separatist substantivalism'; it should be understood as incorporating eternalism and the B-theory. 1 The standard definition of 'instantaneous temporal part' runs as follows: 'x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at t' means '(i) t is an instant, (ii) x is a part of y at t, (iii) x overlaps-at-t every part-at-t of y, (iii) x is present at t, and (iv) x is not present at any other instant'. (This is based on Sider (2001: 59).) For other definitions, see Gibson and Pooley (2006: 163), Parsons (2007), and Balashov (2010: 73). The key point is that, in order for a thing y to count as a temporal part of a thing x, y must be a part of x and y must be spatially co-located with x at any moment at which y is present. 2 A-theories of time all say that there is a time that is present in some absolute, not-merely-indexical sense. That is, they say that there is a 'metaphysically privileged' present time. The B-theory of time denies this. Presentism is an A-theory of time according to which there are no non-present entities (such as, presumably, p...

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Unextended Complexes

Pickup

2016

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Extended simples are fruitfully discussed in metaphysics. They are entities which are located in a complex region of space but do not themselves have parts. In this paper, I will discuss unextended complexes: entities which are not located at a complex region of space but do themselves have parts. In particular, I focus on one type of unextended complex: pointy complexes (entities that have parts but are located at a single point of space). Four areas are indicated where pointy complexes might prove philosophically useful. Unextended complexes are therefore philosophically fruitful, in much the same way as extended simples.

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Spacetime the one substance

Cited by 136 publications

References 27 publications

Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world

Ontological dependence in a spacetime-world

Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime

Unextended Complexes

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