Space, the New Domain: Space Operations and Chinese Military Reforms

Smarter Power, Stronger Partners, Volume II: Trends in Force Projection Against Potential Adversaries

“…53 In 2025, however, China's ability to conduct operations in the SCS has improved considerably. The PLAN's improved AAW capabilities allow it to provide organic air defense in the SCS, and its aircraft carriers enable it to provide fighter cover over the area.…”

“…Vietnam has developed its own A2AD capabilities to deter Chinese military action against its interests. Yet both countries have important economic ties to China, and neither 53 As one senior U.S. Air Force analyst recently observed, A South China Sea conflict, particularly one at far reaches such as the Spratly Islands, will stress the ability of the PLAAF to project airpower in a sustained fashion. Limited aerial refueling capabilities, as well as a limited number of other "high demandlow density" assets such as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and support aircraft, greatly limits the PLAAF's capability to maintain presence over the expanse of the South China Sea.…”

“…52 Space is therefore seen as a potentially decisive arena in this 2015 Taiwan conflict scenario, and China seeks to ensure its ability to operate freely in space while denying the same ability to the United States. 53 However, because of Taiwan's proximity to the mainland and the distances from which U.S. forces must operate, the PLA is much less dependent on space in this scenario than the United States is. China can rely on land-based communications, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and other such capabilities to a much greater extent than the United States can, and this asymmetry in the level of dependence on space systems gives China a strong incentive to degrade or deny U.S. space systems even at the expense of U.S. retaliation in kind against Chinese satellites.…”

“…PLA strategists debate whether certain U.S. space systems, such as U.S. early-warning satellites, are essentially off limits because of the 78 Pollpeter, 2012; 79 Gompert and Saunders, 2011. potential escalation risks or whether they are potentially legitimate targets because they play tactical, as well as strategic, roles in supporting U.S. military operations. By 2025, however, China has launched its own missile early-warning satellites.…”

“…44 Pollpeter, 2011. 45 Pollpeter, 2012; complex for China. China can employ UAVs and other such capabilities, but it is more reliant on space in the SCS than it would be in a conflict over Taiwan because of the greater distances from the Chinese mainland.…”