Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

Enderlein, Henrik; Trebesch, Christoph; Daniels, Laura Von

doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.11.011

Cited by 43 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…The first measure is the index of debtor coerciveness constructed by Enderlein et al (2012), which is procedural and captures differences in crisis characteristics during default, in particular the payment and negotiation behavior of governments towards foreign creditors. The second measure is the main outcome of debt renegotiations, namely the size of creditor losses or "haircuts" implied in debt restructuring agreements that resolve a default.…”

Section: Classifying Hard and Soft Sovereign Defaultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It therefore allows us to capture both the within-crisis variation and the cross-sectional variation in debtor policies. However, as any newly constructed index, the coerciveness index can be criticized as being too broad or too narrow, or for not using the right criteria or weighting scheme (see the detailed discussion in Enderlein et al, 2012).…”

Section: Classifying Hard and Soft Sovereign Defaultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our main explanatory variable during default is a measure on "government coerciveness" towards creditors. This "coerciveness index" is based on a new database on debt crisis resolution processes by Enderlein et al (2012), which categorizes a government's debtor policies on a scale from 1 (very creditor-friendly) to 10 (very confrontational). The dataset tracks government actions towards private external creditors for each year throughout a debt crisis along nine dimensions of payment and negotiation behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default

Trebesch¹,

Zabel

2017

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. How costly are sovereign debt crises? In this paper we study output losses during sovereign default and debt renegotiation episodes since 1980. In contrast to previous work, we account for the severity of default and not only for its occurrence. Specifically, we distinguish between "hard" and "soft" defaults, using new data on debtor payment and negotiation behavior and on the size of haircuts towards private external creditors. We show that hard defaults are associated with a much steeper drop in GDP, of up to ten percent, compared to soft defaults, and address concerns of reverse causality and omitted variable bias. The results question the standard assumption that defaults trigger fixed and lump-sum costs. Instead, our findings are consistent with models assuming proportional output costs of default. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Codes: F340, F410, H630, G010.

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Section: Classifying Hard and Soft Sovereign Defaultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Classifying Hard and Soft Sovereign Defaultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default

Trebesch¹,

Zabel

2017

European Economic Review

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“…The criterion on "explicit threats" is fulfilled whenever a key government actor publicly threatens to repudiate on debt, e.g., via an indefinite moratorium. Table A6 benchmarks the procedural approach in the Greek exchange to that of previous cases of the 1990s and 2000s, using an index of government coerciveness during sovereign debt crises developed by Enderlein et al (2012). The index captures nine dimensions of payment and negotiation behavior vis-à-vis creditors and is additive, so that the maximum degree of debtor coerciveness is 10 (all criteria fulfilled in the run-up to a restructuring).…”

Section: Appendix 2 Overview Of Eligible Securitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy

2013

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The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt reliefover 50 percent of 2012 GDP-with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents-particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors-that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult. JEL Codes: F34

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“…Consideration of default events (suspension of due payments by a state), even though the exact conditions of a default can vary from case to case (cf. [37]), are based on robust, often used and less controversial data (cf. [38]).…”

Section: Sustainable Fiscal Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustainability of Fiscal Policy in Democracies and Autocracies

Wurster

2015

CiS

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This paper tries to identify the fiscal sustainability record of democratically and autocratically governed countries by applying various performance indicators (payment defaults, national debt, foreign assets) and also to clarify what effect the characteristics of a regime have on consolidation and intertemporal budgeting efforts in a country. Important economic, social and environmental challenges of the future cannot be addressed if long term financial viability is not preserved in a country. The study identifies two key findings: while in the past, democracies have clearly found it easier to preserve their solvency and to avoid government bankruptcy, a similar advantage can no longer be detected for democracies in terms of reducing national debt and foreign debts. Why democracies, in spite of their arrangements with a sensitivity for the public good and for due process, are finding it so difficult to avoid shifting their debts to future generations (to undertake cutback measures and to provide sufficient financial foresight) can in principle be interpreted as the other side of the coin, namely highly presence-oriented interests boosted even further through the short democracy-specific time horizon.

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Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

Cited by 43 publications

References 44 publications

The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default

The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default

The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy

Sustainability of Fiscal Policy in Democracies and Autocracies

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