Southeast Asia: In The Shadow of China

Abstract

In this essay, Benjamin Reilly ponders the puzzling pattern of democracy’s presence or absence across Southeast Asia. Indeed, the dearth of democracy in the region’s richest countries (Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore), together with its strength in the poorest (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste) seems to defy the idea—so basic to modernization theory—that stable democracy is fostered by economic development. The reason for this seemingly anomalous situation, says Reilly, lies in the realm of history and geography. He argues that physical proximity to China and the traditional degree of Chinese influence (heavier on the mainland, lighter on the offshore periphery) offer the best explanation of how democracy is distributed across Southeast Asia.

Why does inclusion matter?

“…For processes or governance to be inclusive, formal inclusion in decision making is not enough. Beyond formal provisions for representation or participation, inclusion is also about enabling different groups that are included to exert real influence in the decisions that are made in ways that reflect and address their needs and interests (Putzel and Di John, 2012 [8]; Fuentes and Cookson, 2018 [9]). Inclusion in terms of outcomes has to do with how development outcomes -including prosperity, well-being, and public goods and services -are distributed and shared.…”

“…Despite these improvements, sound redistributive policies on paper are often not sufficient to address entrenched patterns of exclusion or to promote shared development. More than policies themselves, it is the politics of policies that are fundamental in shaping their implementation and effectiveness (Booth, 2012[44]; Putzel and Di John, 2012 [8]; Levy, 2014 [48]; Rocha Menocal, 2017 [49]; World Bank, 2017 [45]; Hickey, Sen and Bukenya, 2014 [10]). So even if, in principle, inclusive governance is intended to change the distribution and exercise of power in society, institutions reflect power dynamics and prevailing ideologies; additionally, policy outcomes and development depend on the quality of institutions (both formal and informal and especially how these interact) and the power relations and ideas and values underpinning a political system (World Bank, 2017 [45]; Rocha Menocal, 2017 [49]; Abdulai and Hickey, 2016 [50]) (Hickey, Sen and Bukenya, 2014 [10]; Putzel and Di John, 2012 [8]; de Mello and Dutz, 2012 [51]).…”

Die Eiserne Seidenstraße

“…Schließlich ergriffen die Militärs im September 2006 die Initiative und putschten (Ji 2007 Mit der gleichen Selbstverständlichkeit hat die chinesische Regierung das Projekt dann nach dem Putsch im Mai 2014 mit den neuen royalistisch-konservativen Machthabern weiter verfolgt . Arbeiten im Stil der oben zitierten von Reilly (2013) oder Grävingholt (2011) mögen eine Nähe der chinesischen Regierung zum autoritären Regierungsstil der neuen Administration herausstellen . Ideologisch trennt jedoch die nominell kommunistische Partei Chinas auch viel von einer Regierung, die sich offen royalistisch präsentiert .…”

Authoritarian Durability: Public Opinion towards Democracy in Southeast Asia

“…While there is a growing tension between the middle class and the elite political culture, the middle classes are not overly supportive of dismantling the one-party system (Gainsborough, 2012). Reilly (2013) suggests that Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are heavily integrated with China and perhaps this is one of the reasons why the political culture is fairly distinct from other countries further away from China's influence, particularly those situated off the mainland in Maritime Southeast Asia.…”