South Korea's democratization movements, 1980–1987: political structure, political opportunity, and framing

Abstract

Through a case study of democratization movements in South Korea from 1980 to 1987, this study aims to contribute to further sophistication of social movement theories. Recognizing the limitation of the existing political opportunity approach, this paper presents a systematic definition of political opportunity structure and shows the mechanism through which it plays a role in the development of a social movement. In particular, in explaining South Korea's democratization movements, the authors distinguish political opportunity from its structure and suggest political opportunity as a framework that could explain the changes in risks and changes affecting social movements.

Opposing Power

“…There were several, in fact (Cumings 2005, 299-301). The first indicator of accelerating regime vulnerability is the opposition's surprising gains just a year earlier in the February 1985 legislative elections, just as the Filipino opposition parties made surprising gains in their May 1984 legislative elections (Choe and Kim 2012). In South Korea, the opposition New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) won 67 out of the 276 legislative seats, or almost one-quarter of all seats.…”

“…NKDP thus set out to increase its organizational size and capabilities in the immediate aftermath of the elections, just as Salvador Laurel's UNIDO established its position as the leading opposition party in the Philippines after the May 1984 legislative elections. Toward that end, NKDP's leaders sought cooperation with other antigovernment civil society groups, such as church organizations, student groups, and labor unions in the months following its surprising gains in February 1985 (Choe and Kim 2012;J. Lee 2000;N.…”

Reappraisal of the political approach on East Asian welfare state development: the case of childcare expansion in South Korea

“…The failure of the Gwangju revolution in bringing a democratic government triggered the consolidation of a larger cross-class alliance backing seven years later, which set the stage for the second wave of the democratic revolution, which finally erupted in June 1987. More than 1,400,000 people took to the streets, joined in large demonstrations, demanding reforms and pushing the state to be more democratic (Choe and Kim, 2012). While South Korea was experiencing a shift away from an authoritarian regime towards a more democratic governance, the political channels for civil society to be involved in the public policy decisions were increasingly opening up.…”

“…Many studies (Kwon, 2017; Lee and Kim, 2019; Vincent, 2017) demonstrate South Korea's political transition in the 1990s encouraged many political actors from different backgrounds to compete with each other in promoting universal welfare. This can be found especially in the early 2000s when South Korean politics was transitioning towards democracy, fertility rates were rapidly declining and the issues of working-family imbalance was increasing (Choe and Kim, 2012). Under these circumstances, many politicians raised the voice for childcare expansion as a political strategy to appeal to voters and maintain legitimization.…”

“…Traditionally, political explanations of East Asian welfare state development often draw upon the power resource model (Choe and Kim, 2012; Kim and Shi, 2019; Ku, 2007; Peng, 2011; Yon, 2007), which views social policy expansion as the outcome of vibrant coalitions between the leftist party, interest groups, civil society and working-class unions in controlling public policy (Korpi, 1983; Myles and Quadagno, 2002; Olsen and O'Connor, 1998). Although in some instances power resource's assumption is acceptable, as found in the experience in South Korea, where the working-class coalition and civil society alliance through the tripartite commission formed by the government contributed to reforming the Korean welfare system during the 1997–1998 economic crisis (Kim and Shi, 2019; Lee and Kim, 2019; Vincent, 2017).…”