Do political consultants' roles in American elections reflect candidate-centered or party-centered politics? I reassess the argument that American politics is candidate-centered if party organizations cannot nominate congressional candidates. I evaluate an overlooked means of party influence over U.S. House nominations via the market for consultants, many of whom contract with party committees to conduct electioneering activities while others maintain contractual autonomy from party committees. This dichotomy between connected and unconnected consulting firms is a consequence of campaign finance policy contributing to the expansion of parties' coordinated and independent spending efforts. Many political consulting firms that contract with parties also take on House candidates as clients, while other firms with candidate clients do not contract with parties. I assess whether candidate use of the fonner type-i.e., the party-agent consultant-increases the ability to win a primary election compared to hiring the latter type, the free agent, controlling for firms' past records of success, client loads, and primary election characteristics. The results indicate that use of party-connected consultants increases a primary candidate's electoral prospects, and they reveal party influence, though not quite control, over House nomination.