Explaining legislators’ positions on outside income limits: Voting on honoraria ceilings in the U.S. Senate, 1981–1983

Rosenson, Beth

doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9181-x

Cited by 17 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…The reason is that the income data are only made public in three income bands (€1000–3500, €3500–7000, and above €7000), and politicians themselves can indicate whether income is received annually or monthly. As this allows politicians to ‘game the system’ and hide substantial revenue streams, the income data lack reliability (Geys and Mause, , p. 267; a similar view on analogous US data is also provided in Rosenson, ). Even so, it is important to highlight that the number of outside jobs employed here is positively correlated with a (admittedly crude) measure of earnings constructed from the available income information by assuming that the MP earns the lower end of the income band for each job reported (for further details, see Mause, ).…”

Section: Mps’ Extra‐parliamentary Activitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Looks Good, You’re Hired? Evidence from Extra-Parliamentary Activities of German Parliamentarians

Geys

2015

German Economic Review

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Abstract. Politicians have been shown to benefit electorally from an attractive physical appearance. Employing data on 614 German MPs, this note explores whether it also affects their success/failure in the market for extra-parliamentary activities. An attractive physical appearance is found to mainly benefit female MPs, especially for privatesector jobs. This is particularly driven by MPs' perceived likability. While MP's perceived beauty is shown to have no direct effects for extra-parliamentary activities, our findings suggest important indirect effects.JEL classification: J45, H8.

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Section: Mps’ Extra‐parliamentary Activitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Looks Good, You’re Hired? Evidence from Extra-Parliamentary Activities of German Parliamentarians

Geys

2015

German Economic Review

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“…Empirical Evidence Rosenson (2003Rosenson ( , 2007 shows that politicians' financial self-interest (measured via historical honoraria income) is an important constraining factor on their willingness to support laws initiated to limit elected representatives' honoraria income from speechmaking, articles, or appearances. This holds both for US state legislators in the 1960s and 1970s (Rosenson 2003) and US senators in the 1980s (Rosenson 2007).…”

Section: Moonlighting Financial Self-interest and The Returns From Polmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This holds both for US state legislators in the 1960s and 1970s (Rosenson 2003) and US senators in the 1980s (Rosenson 2007). However, valuing the option to earn outside income obviously need not reflect an excessive focus on financial self-interest.…”

Section: Moonlighting Financial Self-interest and The Returns From Polmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the other extreme, an apparently simple solution is to implement legislation which declares certain -or all -sideline jobs as incompatible with the political mandate (an option recently discussed in the UK and the European Parliament; e.g., Porter 2009;Guardian 2010;Brand 2011). Similarly, legislation might be implemented which limits (1) the time allowed for moonlighting activities and/or (2) the outside income received from such activities (e.g., Rosenson 2007;van Aaken and Voigt 2009;Gagliarducci et al 2010). …”

Section: The Regulation Of Moonlighting: the Ideal Parliament?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda

Geys

Mäuse²

2013

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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Elected representatives in many countries are legally allowed to carry out (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate, often referred to as 'moonlighting'. Despite the important selection and incentive effects such outside positions might engender, academic studies evaluating the prevalence, desirability and/or consequences of politicians' moonlighting have remained relatively scarce; often due to severe data restrictions. In recent years, however, more stringent disclosure rules have increased data availability, and large-sample analyses are becoming increasingly feasible. Besides surveying recent empirical contributions to this developing research field, this paper also outlines unresolved issues and thereby develops an agenda for future enquiry.

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“…A small, but growing literature examines the income of Western politicians and bureaucrats which is often published in as part of anti-corruption measures or electoral campaigns (e.g. Rosenson 2007, Rinke et al 2009, Kean and Merlo 2010. However, the data is always derived from developed countries with established democracy and relatively high tax compliance and therefore assumes that the reported information represents the true income of the politician.…”

Section: Model and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Return as a Political Statement

Libman¹,

Schultz

Graeber

2016

Review of Law &Amp; Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThe accuracy of a tax return is usually interpreted as an outcome of the tax evasion decision by an individual. However, in non-democratic regimes with predatory blackmail tax systems it is possible that large sums voluntarily reported by influential politicians or businessmen may be used as political statements. By openly acknowledging one's personal income an individual can signal the strength of one's position, or, on the contrary, the submissiveness to the political leadership. In this paper we explore the idea of the tax return as a political statement and test it using a unique dataset of the tax returns filed by the Russian regional governors and the members of their families for the year 2009. Our results conjecture that Russian governors may deliberately file their tax return as a political statement to signal their strength vis-à-vis the central government.

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Explaining legislators’ positions on outside income limits: Voting on honoraria ceilings in the U.S. Senate, 1981–1983

Abstract: Outside income, Ethics, Honoraria, Legislative voting, Pay raise,

Cited by 17 publications

References 43 publications

Looks Good, You’re Hired? Evidence from Extra-Parliamentary Activities of German Parliamentarians

Looks Good, You’re Hired? Evidence from Extra-Parliamentary Activities of German Parliamentarians

Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda

Tax Return as a Political Statement

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