Sounds fully simplified

Leddington, Jason

doi:10.1093/analys/any075

Cited by 12 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…For example, philosophical accounts of olfactory experience according to which odors represent worldly things (such as Batty 2010; Mizrahi 2014; Roberts 2016) are consistent with the view that smell has sight-like epistemological power. Philosophical accounts according to which auditory experience represents worldly things (for example, Meadows 2018; O'Callaghan 2007; Leddington 2019) are consistent with the view that hearing has sight-like epistemological power. Touch is complicated.…”

Section: The Epistemological Power Of Tastementioning

confidence: 88%

The Epistemological Power of Taste

Richardson¹

2021

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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It is generally accepted that sight—the capacity to see or to have visual experiences—has the power to give us knowledge about things in the environment and some of their properties in a distinctive way. Seeing the goose on the lake puts me in a position to know that it is there and that it has certain properties. And it does this by, when all goes well, presenting us with these features of the goose. One might even think that it is part of what it is to be a perceptual capacity that it has this kind of epistemological power, such that a capacity that lacked this power could not be perceptual. My focus in this essay is the sense of taste—the capacity to taste things or to have taste experiences. It has sometimes been suggested that taste lacks sight-like epistemological power. I argue that taste has epistemological power of the same kind as does sight, but that as a matter of contingent fact, that power often goes unexercised in our contemporary environment. We can know about things by tasting them in the same kind of way as we can know about things by seeing them, but we often do not. I then consider the significance of this conclusion. I suggest that in one way, it matters little, because our primary interest in taste (in marked contrast to our other senses) is not epistemic but aesthetic. But, I end by suggesting, it can matter ethically.

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Section: The Epistemological Power Of Tastementioning

confidence: 88%

The Epistemological Power of Taste

Richardson¹

2021

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…First, although a bell being struck can be seen, and onions being fried can be smelt, seeing and smelling do not allow for the perception of pitch, timbre, or loudness, and so, by identifying sounds with combinations of these audible qualities, Property keeps sounds out of reach of non‐hearers. Second, drawing on work by Lewis (1986), Sanford (1985), and Ehring (2009), Leddington (2019, fn. 8) argues that we can think of property instances as a type of event which can stand in causal relations to other types of event, and that therefore we can think of sound properties of source events as being caused by those source events: the striking of the bell both causes and instantiates its sound in something like the same way we might think of the explosion of a firework causes and instantiates its greenness.…”

Section: Sounds As Events or Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 1 The labels Property, Parthood and Identity are taken from Leddington, 2019 …”

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confidence: 99%

Sounds as properties

Young

2021

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Leddington has recently put forward a new version of the idea that sounds are properties. Whereas other ‘property views’ take material objects to be the bearers of sounds (the sound of a bell being struck is a property instantiated by the bell itself), on Leddington's view sounds are borne by the source events in which these objects are participating (the sound of a bell being struck is a property instantiated by the striking event). In this paper, I argue that the case for events as the bearers of sound properties rather than objects is, at best, ambiguous, and that there are good reasons for wanting to include objects amongst the things we hear. I put forward a new account on which sounds are temporally extended properties of objects. This approach, I argue, not only retains the advantages of Leddington's view, but also allows for the audibility of both objects and events.

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“…The view seems applicable to the case of hearing speech sounds in a particular voice: a typical auditory experience of speech sounds is an experience of speech sounds as apparently having been produced by the voice. Voice can be 14 An alternative interesting construal of the property view can be found in Leddington (2019). Leddington defends a view according to which sounds are audible properties of their event sources.…”

Section: Voice Speech Sounds and Their Sourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bringing back the voice: on the auditory objects of speech perception

Drożdżowicz

2020

Synthese

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When you hear a person speaking in a familiar language you perceive the speech sounds uttered and the voice that produces them. How are speech sounds and voice related in a typical auditory experience of hearing speech in a particular voice? And how to conceive of the objects of such experiences? I propose a conception of auditory objects of speech perception as temporally structured mereologically complex individuals. A common experience is that speech sounds and the voice that produces them appear united. I argue that the metaphysical underpinnings of the experienced unity of speech sounds and voices can be explained in terms of the mereological view on sounds and their sources. I also propose a psychological explanation (the Voice Shaping Speech model) of how we form and individuate the auditory objects of experiences of listening to speech in a particular voice. Voice characteristics enable determining the identity of auditory objects of speech sound perception by making some features of the speech signal stable and predictable.

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Sounds fully simplified

Cited by 12 publications

References 9 publications

The Epistemological Power of Taste

The Epistemological Power of Taste

Sounds as properties

Bringing back the voice: on the auditory objects of speech perception

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