Some reflections on the question of the goals of EU competition law

Abstract

efficiency) advances that if the magnitude of the gains from moving from one state of the economy to another is greater than the magnitude of the losses, then social welfare is increased by making the move even, if no actual compensation is made 12. According to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, an outcome is efficient if those that are made better off can, potentially, compensate those that were made worse off, with the resulting outcome still being Pareto optimal. The winners should, in theory, be able to compensate the losers, but there is no requirement that compensation should be effectively paid. The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is based on the following two fundamental theorems of welfare economics 13 : "The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals and firms are selfish price takers. Then a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals and producers are selfish price takers. Then almost any Pareto optimal equilibrium conclusions reached at the doctrinal stage). For example, the economic efficiency versus justice debate that permeates the question of the objectives of competition law belongs to the jurisprudential stage as it refers to the values that should provide content to the principle of coherence in legal interpretation. We have focused elsewhere on the interaction of economics and the law at the doctrinal and adjudicative stage: Lianos, I. (2009) 'Lost in translation? Towards a theory of economic transplants', Current Legal Problems 62(1) 346-404. This study will mainly focus on the jurisprudential stage, although as I will further explain, and probably contrary to Dworkin's view, there is a considerable interplay and mutual dependence between the jurisprudential and adjudicative stages, as in reality the values pursued by the specific legal system are function of a comparative institutional analysis performed at the adjudicative stage. However, for the adepts of a normative perspective in EU competition law, the two stages are clearly separated, with the adjudicative stage being locked in to decisions made at the jurisprudential stage. 11 One could advance a growth-related theory of competition law emphasizing the supply side, instead of the demand side (consumers). There is evidence that competition increases the chances of innovation and growth: Arrow, K (1962) 'Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions', in (R. Nelson ed.) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, NBER (noting that a monopolist that is not exposed to actual or potential competition has less incentive to invest in R&D than a firm in a competitive industry);

The Impact of Independence on Regulatory Outcomes: the Case of EU Competition Policy

“…Among the public policies of the European Union (EU), competition (or antitrust) policy – which is aimed at preventing abuses of market power or forms of collusion between undertakings – is the one in which the European Commission (and its powerful DG COMP, Directorate‐General for Competition) enjoys the greatest autonomy from both EU legislators (European Parliament and Council) and Member States’ governments (McGowan and Cini, , p. 177; Cini and McGowan, ; Wilks, ). The literature has identified several objectives of competition policy in the EU: economic welfare, integration of the internal market, the protection of consumers, the freedom to compete (Lianos, ; see also Cini and McGowan, ). Since the introduction of a European competition regime (in the Treaty of Paris, 1951, and the Treaty of Rome, 1957, and then with Council Regulation 19/62), the Commission has managed to secure its control over every stage of the policy implementation and enforcement.…”

Slovenian Complementary Health Insurance Reform – Dichotomy between the Internal Market and the Social Dimension

“…11 Lianos (2013 or ordoliberal project, but also in the light of social welfare. 15 Perhaps such a stance paves the way for a new paradigm which does not distinguish so strictly between the internal market and the social dimension, and finally acknowledges that the ultimate goal of both is the same -to maximize social welfare.…”

“…This view is also shared by de Vries (2011) andLianos (2013).16 The remaining public funds represented the municipal budget funds and the state budget funds, including investments by the state and municipalities (6.3% of total resources) and funds for long-term health care expenditure (Pension and Disability Insurance Institute Supplement: 2.3% of total resources) (Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia, 2015).…”

“…7 A consequentialist or utilitarian approach also prevails with regard to the objectives of EU competition law under the Lisbon Treaty, which is based on increasing social welfare. SeeLianos (2013).8 Such an approach is, in the light of the economic nature of European integration as its main guideline, completely understandable.…”

A tagállami társasági adók és az állami támogatások közötti összefüggések

“…A tágan értelmezett állami szabályozás spektrumának kiterjesztésével kapcsolatban azon az állásponton vagyunk, hogy a szabályozás kiterjesztése az állam gazdaságban betöltött tulajdonosi szerepe csökkenésének következménye, és ennek szükségességéta piac tökéletlensége miatt és a piaci kudarcok elkerülése érdekében -, korlátozott mértékben, a mainstream közgazdaságtan is elfogadja (Posner 1974;Ricketts 2006). Peltzman (1989) célkitűzések mellett is -eltérő utat jár(t) be (Möschel 2007) A verseny jótékony gazdasági hatásairól számos tanulmány született, úgy az antitröszt szabályozás (Posner 1979;Lianos 2013), mint az állami támogatási rendszerek tekintetében (Blauberger 2008;DeVito 2011). A versenyszabályozás motívuma az állam által alakított gazdálkodási környezet, a verseny bizonyos fokú biztosítása; a szabadság fokát azonban más, gazdaság-és társadalompolitikai célok (kutatás-fejlesztés, innováció, foglalkoztatottság, stb.)…”