The Impact of Independence on Regulatory Outcomes: the Case of EU Competition Policy

Abstract

Independent regulatory agencies are created in order to enhance the stability and credibility of economic regulation, and to improve policy implementation. So far, most research in political science has focused on explaining the reasons for independence, while less attention has been paid to analysing the consequences of independence. Aiming to start filling this gap, this article seeks to test if (and to what extent) independence makes a difference in competition policy enforcement. Original data on formal independence of national competition agencies in EU member states from 1993 to 2009 are employed to test if different degrees of independence (and changes in independence over time) affect foreign direct investment and consumer prices. The results indicate that the formal independence of a competition agency does not have any significant impact on either indicator, thus questioning the assumption that independence yields better regulatory performance

Beyond legal transposition: regulatory agencies and de facto convergence of EU rail liberalization

“…These findings are consistent with previous literature that shows the positive impact of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) on the implementation of EU rail liberalization (Nash 2008;Versluis and Tarr 2013). By highlighting the role of IRAs on railway policy convergence, this paper also contributes to an emerging literature on the impact of agentification on EU compliance (García Quesada 2014), the adoption of standards (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011), and the quality of regulatory governance (Guidi 2015;Vining, Laurin and Weimer 2015).…”

The European Commission's Fight against Cartels (1962–2014): A Retrospective and Forensic Analysis

“…17 IP/95/1355, Brussels, 6.12.1995 Wilks andVan Miert (1996) from an institutional point of view, provide a revision of the drawbacks of the proposed independent agency. Guidi (2015) analyses the effect of competition commission independence on performance. 19 Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C 207, 18.7.1996). Since 1998 onwards, the leniency programme has been broadly applied in nearly all the uncovered cartels sanctioned by the EC, as shown in Figure 6.…”

Does formal independence of regulators change? Evidence from Portuguese agencies

“…When analyzing the influence politicians have over agencies, other studies have focused on how politicians intervene in the daily activities of regulators according to or in spite of legal restrictions (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2015;Fernández-i-Marín, Jordana, & Bianculli, 2016;Hanretty & Koop, 2013;Maggetti, 2007;Thatcher, 2005). This article adds to the existing work on institutional change (Di Mascio, Maggetti, & Natalini, 2018;Maggetti, 2014) and the diachronic evolution of formal independence of competition authorities (Guidi, 2015) not only by increasing the number of observations and sectors compared in the research, but also by testing the pertinence of previously tested hypotheses. If lawmakers reform the laws governing agencies, this suggests that de jure independence still plays a relevant role as an instrument of control, in addition to politicization or other factors.…”

“…Although principals may or may not make use of control mechanisms, it is the law that defines that possibility and preestablishes what politicians are allowed to do. This article adds to the existing work on institutional change (Di Mascio, Maggetti, & Natalini, 2018;Maggetti, 2014) and the diachronic evolution of formal independence of competition authorities (Guidi, 2015) not only by increasing the number of observations and sectors compared in the research, but also by testing the pertinence of previously tested hypotheses.…”