Some doubts about measuring self-interest using dictator experiments: the costs of anonymity

Frohlich, Norman; Oppenheimer, Joe; Moore, John

doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00178-0

Cited by 95 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…On these occasions moral distance is null and there is an actual obligation to donate; an obligation that the dictators usually fulfill. 14 In these cases we also find self-interested behavior. Given that the moral distance is null, there are those who keep all the money.…”

Section: Moral Dilemma and Consequentialist Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 57%

Moral Distance and Moral Motivations in Dictator Games

Aguiar¹,

Brañas–Garza

Miller

2007

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. analogous experiments, we conclude that dicator behavior can be understood in terms of moral distance rather than social distance and that it systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic models and game theory. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Moral Dilemma and Consequentialist Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 57%

Moral Distance and Moral Motivations in Dictator Games

Aguiar¹,

Brañas–Garza

Miller

2007

SSRN Journal

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“…As Frohlich et al [10] points out, subjects do not believe that the recipient will actually receive the money they have donated. Outside of the lab, in the real world, people doubt that donations really help much, because a non-negligible part of the money disappears along the way.…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Eckel & Grossman [8], where the recipient was the Red Cross, only 17% gave half, 10% gave all and 27% gave nothing! According to Frohlich, Oppenheimer & Moore [10], the lack of generosity is due to the fact that subjects do not believe the veracity of the experiment. To put it another way, subjects have reasonable doubts as to who will receive the money and whether or not the recipient does, in fact, exist.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Poverty in dictator games: Awakening solidarity

Brañas–Garza

2006

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

146

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This paper investigates the effect of poverty and good intentions on dictator game giving. Previous experimental studies in which information was supplied to dictators about recipients have shown that dictator giving increases overall in this context. We develop a new design of standard informed dictator games with three main variants: 1) three recipients are used instead of one; 2) dictators are informed that their recipients are poor; 3) dictators give donations in the form of medicines instead of money. We have found that 46% of the experimental subjects (dictators) give the full amount of money (100% of the endowment) in the 'poverty' treatment, while in the 'medicines' treatment this percentage increases to 72%. Such extremely generous behavior has seldom been observed in the previous literature on dictator games.

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“…games (Frolich, Oppenheimer and Moore [16]). This dichotomy can pertain both to a typology of individuals and to a single conflicted individual.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a consequence, in each state there is some alternative that has a higher utility than a in A [ B, and therefore a must be chosen with probability zero 5 E.g. Frolich, Oppenheimer and Moore [16] and Dufwenberg and Muren [9] (choices in a dictator games concentrated on giving nothing or 50/50), Sura, Shmuelib, Bosec and Dubeyc [35] (bimodal distributions in ratings, such as Amazon), Plerou, Gopikrishnan, and Stanley [30] (phase transition to bimodal demand "bulls and bears"-in financial markets), Engelmann and Normann [13] (bimodality on maximum and minimum effort levels in minimum effort games), McClelland, Schulze and Coursey [26] (bimodal beliefs for unlikely events and willingness to insure).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dual random utility maximisation

Manzini

Mariotti

2018

Journal of Economic Theory

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Dual Random Utility Maximisation (dRUM) is Random Utility Maximisation when utility depends on only two states. dRUM has many relevant behavioural interpretations and practical applications. We show that it is (generically) the only stochastic choice rule that satisfies Regularity and two new simple properties: Constant Expansion (if the choice probability of an alternative is the same across two menus, then it is the same in the combined menu), and Negative Expansion (if the choice probability of an alternative is less than one and differs across two menus, then it vanishes in the combined menu). By extending the theory to menu-dependent state probabilities we are able to accommodate prominent violations of Regularity such as the attraction, similarity and compromise effects. J.E.L. codes: D03, D01

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Some doubts about measuring self-interest using dictator experiments: the costs of anonymity

Cited by 95 publications

References 6 publications

Moral Distance and Moral Motivations in Dictator Games

Moral Distance and Moral Motivations in Dictator Games

Poverty in dictator games: Awakening solidarity

Dual random utility maximisation

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