Moral Distance and Moral Motivations in Dictator Games

Abstract

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Do fairness and race matter in generosity? Evidence from a nationally representative charity experiment

“…Subjects from the broader population gave $72.3 on average and subjects from the student population gave $54.7 on average. Even higher levels of giving, 86% of the pie on average, occurred in a dictator game where dictators could contribute money toward donations of medicine to centers in Asia, Africa, and South America (Aguiar et al, 2008). 12 Finally, in an experiment similar to this one, where a nationally representative sample played dictator games in which the recipients were victims of Hurricane Katrina, the average offer was $65 out of $100 (Fong and Luttmer, 2009).…”

Rich Meets Poor – An International Fairness Experiment

“…As Norwegians and Germans are almost equally rich and were almost just as productive in the experiment, only nationality considerations could explain a difference in the transfers in the two types of distributive situations. Finally, to study the extent to which our findings were the result of a self-serving bias among the rich, the poor participants also made a similar 1 For related experimental studies of social preferences, see Aguiar, Brañas-Garza, and Miller (2007) and Eckel and Grossman (1996) on the role of needs, Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007a); Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007b) ;Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) ;Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki (2004); Konow (2000), and Konow (1996) on the role of entitlements, and Whitt and Wilson (2007) on the role of nationality. For an overview of the experimental literature on social preferences, see Camerer (2003).…”

Reasons for Doing Good: Behavioural Explanations of Prosociality in Economics

“…The amount offered is affected also by a degree of familiarity with a beneficiary -for example when given an opportunity to donate to the Red Cross, as much as 73% dictators decide to do so, comparing with only 27% donating to some unknown organisation (Eckel, Grossman, 1996b). And finally, participants share more willingly, if they know that their money is given to poor people or will be spent on medicines (Brañas-Garza, 2006;Aguiar et al, 2008). There are some researchers who even believe that the dictator game cannot measure altruism or any other form of prosocial behaviour and the observed effect is merely forced by expectations of experimenters (Frohlich et al, 2001;Zizzo, 2011).…”