He [Kafka, acc. to Benjamin] wanted to preserve it [viz. tradition] even though it was not truth, if only for the sake of this "new beauty in what is vanishing […] and he knew, on the other hand, that there is no more effective way to break the spell of tradition than to cut out the "rich and strange," coral and pearls, from what had been handed down in one solid piece.Hannah Arendt (2019, liii) I'm speaking to my ancestors. And of course I don't see eye-to-eye with my ancestors. But at the same time I cannot deny their existence.Jerzy Grotowski and Elizabeth LeCompte in Rebecca Schneider (2011, 111) For remembrance, which is only one, though one of the most important, modes of thought, is helpless outside a pre-established framework of reference, and the human mind is only on the rarest occasions capable of retaining something which is altogether unconnected. Hannah Arendt (1961, 6) We are all complicit. There are no bystanders, only degrees of perpetration, as Ute Frevert said in a recent speech. 1 To speak of bystanders offers exculpation to people who can claim, in hindsight, to have committed no evil. To deny such exculpation demands a new conception of agency. It stipulates that we act even when we think of ourselves as not acting, as being passive, as merely observing the actions of other. I will use this consideration as an entry point to Hannah Arendt's 129 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 5 (1) (2019) insistence on the difference between the public and the private. Historically speaking, "inner emigration" or retreat into privacy appeared as an adequate response to totalitarian rule. But Arendt's insistence on maintaining the difference between private and public cannot be used as an excuse for inaction in the public sphere. What does the difference between public and private mean for us today? I will argue that Arendt's distinction between public and private cannot be maintained in the abstract. It requires concrete "performance" in order to be realized. One such performance I will discuss is that of Miriam Shenitzer's A Putative Life of Hannah Arendt, a faux biographical series of images and objects that confounds the biographical expectation of insight into the intimate and private side of a thinker, turning the gaze back on the viewer and challenging us to reconsider our conceptions of knowledge of individuality and personality in an age of a massive in/voluntary erasure of the boundaries between private and public. It thus restores the ineffability of the individual in form of a public display that disputes access to the life of Arendt. Shenitzer's "putative" biographical portrait of Hannah Arendt thus marks an Arendtian performance of the elusive distinction between private and public.