Sociopsychological Perspectives on the Active Roles of Domestic Actors in Transition to a Lower Carbon Electricity Economy

Abstract

The call for a transition to a lower carbon electricity economy for the UK is growing louder (COC, 2008). EU and UK climate legislation is putting increasing pressure on the energy industry to meet demanding carbon reduction and renewable targets (BERR, 2008; EC, 2008). Much of this legislation applies to the generation, distribution, and supply of electricity, underlining the significance of these activities to the UK's overall carbon profile (DTI, 2006). Energy security/capacity concerns are also becoming more important, as many of the coal and nuclear plants currently in use in the UK are due to close within the next ten^fifteen years due to the combined effects of the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive and old age. If end-use demand continues to grow at present rates, this would leave a 25 GW (approximately 30%) gap in capacity (DTI, 2006, page 92). The rate of growth of electricity demand is a key determinant of the scale of a potential`generation gap', and hence the likely scale of investment needed beyond replacement levels.Nearly a quarter of UK greenhouse gas emissions are due to electricity and gas supply linked to demands for residential lighting, heating, and power services (DECC, 2008). Efforts to reduce these emissions focus on three types of action: (1) decarbonisation of supply, eg by generating electricity from renewable sources; (2) increasing the efficiency of delivering end-use services, eg by using more efficient lighting, refrigeration, or other end-use technologies; and (3) reducing the level of end-use service demands, eg turning off devices when not in use. These require, respectively, increasingly active roles of

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