Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics

Lindbeck, Assar; Nyberg, Sten; Weibull, Jörgen W.

doi:10.1162/154247603322391170

Cited by 70 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 3 publications

(5 reference statements)

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“…The high and volatile work absence due to sickness observed in several countries during the last decades has spurred researchers to discuss the importance of norms and social interactions in this context (Lindbeck and Persson, 2010;Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006;Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 2003;Ichino and Maggi, 2000). Several studies have…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment

Johansson

Lindahl

2012

Empir Econ

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment

Johansson

Lindahl

2012

Empir Econ

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“…Besley and Coate (1992a), for example, assumed that the utility of being on welfare is reduced by some function of the fraction of the population that is not truly needy and is instead reducing labor supply to go onto welfare. Lindbeck et al (1999) simply assumed that the utility of being on welfare is reduced by the number of others who are on welfare, but went on to analyze the voting equilibria that would set benefit levels that would generate different welfare caseloads as an equilibrium outcome. In a somewhat different vein, Nechbya (1999) assumed that the stigma of having nonmarital births (which is a condition for welfare eligibility) is reduced by the magnitude of the aggregate nonmarital birth rate, and then showed that a change in welfare benefits can initiate a nontrivial change in that birth rate through multiplier effects.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program

Moffitt¹

2002

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The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program was created in 1996 from what was previously named the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The TANF program is intended to serve low-income families, primarily those with only a single parent present, as did the AFDC program. The TANF program is distinguished from AFDC by strong work requirements, time limits on receipt, options for the provision of noncash assistance, and by a block grant financing structure. This paper reviews the rules of the TANF program and the research that has been conducted on it and on the AFDC program. financing through block grants, to the individual states; (2) the imposition of strict work requirements in order to qualify for federal aid; and (3) lifetime limits on the number of years of benefit receipt which could be paid out of federal funds. This paper reviews the rules and structure of the TANF program and compares them with the historical AFDC program. In addition, it reviews the caseloads, costs, and participation rates of the TANF and AFDC programs. Finally, it reviews the research that has been conducted on both programs. Given the relative youth of the former, relatively little scholarly research has been conducted on it to date. Consequently, the bulk of the research will be reviewed for the AFDC program. Some discussion will also be provided of the extent to which the results of the AFDC research can be expected to apply to the TANF program.The first section reviews the rules and history of the programs. The second section reviews the trends in caseloads and expenditures and other program characteristics, followed by a section on the research results. A final section discusses reforms of the financial incentives in the program. A short, but more detailed, history of the major developments in the AFDC program can be found in Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986, Chapter 4). That discussion also includes an account of the history of income support programs prior to AFDC. I. History, Rules, and GoalsHistory and Rules of the AFDC Program. Table 1 shows the major pieces of legislation creating and altering the AFDC program over its history, 1935-1996. 1 The program was created by the Social Security Act of 1935 along with the Old-Age Social Security and Unemployment Insurance programs. AFDC provided cash financial support to families with "dependent" children, defined as those who were deprived of the support or care of one natural (i.e., biological) parent by reason of death, disability, or absence from the home, and were under the care of the other parent or another relative. Although the language of the legislation was genderneutral, in practice the vast majority of families of this type consisted of a mother and her children, or what are today called single-mother families. Although the presence of the father was possible if he was the single parent or if he was disabled, the overwhelming majority of participating families were initially, and have continued to be, those where the father is...

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“…For a different explanation of why a generous social safety net may induce persistence pointing to the role of work norms, see e.g. Lindbeck (1995) and Lindbeck et al (2003). If there is a strong norm to be self-supporting, employment may be high, even if economic incentives to work are small due to generous welfare schemes.…”

Section: Business Cycle Dependent Unemployment Insurancementioning

confidence: 99%

Automatic stabilizers—the intersection of labour market and fiscal policies

Andersen

2016

IZA J Labor Stud

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The Great Recession has revived aggregate demand management policies. In particular, automatic stabilizers are praised since they are rule based and thus operate swiftly and symmetrically across the cycle. However, automatic stabilizers are not a result of macro design but the structure of the social safety net and the taxation system. The participation tax is a key determinant of the strength of the automatic stabilizers. Paradoxically, the disincentive effects of high participation taxes are often discussed at the same time as automatic stabilizers are praised. The paper considers the sources of automatic stabilizers and whether they (un)intentionally have been weakened via structural reforms to strengthen work incentives. It is considered whether it is possible to maintain strong automatic stabilizers without jeopardizing incentives via the design of the social safety net (workfare) or business cycle-dependent unemployment insurance. The criticism that automatic stabilizers may prolong downturns is also considered. Finally, it is discussed to what extent aggregate demand management policy can stabilize labour markets and, in particular, whether it is well targeted towards marginalized groups. Also, the potential sources of marginalization in the labour market are discussed.JEL Classification: E62; H24; H61; J60.

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Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics

Cited by 70 publications

References 3 publications

Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment

Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program

Automatic stabilizers—the intersection of labour market and fiscal policies

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