Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment

Johansson, Per; Lindahl, Erica

doi:10.1007/s00181-012-0593-1

“…This mechanism is similar in spirit to the pre‐programme effects found in UI literature, and now also seen in the sickness insurance literature ( Johansson and Lindahl, ). The implication is that if the ‘cost’ of being unemployed, or of sickness absence, increases, this may increase the exit from the programme.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworksupporting

confidence: 81%

“… The reason for the former is that despite no evidence of any positive effects from the vocational rehabilitation of those on sick leave, there is, by now, evidence of threat effects in the sickness insurance scheme (de Jong et al ., ; Hägglund, ; Hartman et al ., ; Johansson and Lindahl, ). In other words, there is an increased hazard from sick leave when individuals are monitored and before entering rehabilitation schemes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…However, although it may be intuitive and theoretically motivated, the strategy of early intervention during a spell of sick leave relies either on the presence of efficient back‐to‐work strategies or on the deterring effects of screening and monitoring. While the empirical literature offers no strong support for a reduction in sick leave due to different vocational rehabilitation programmes, (Elders et al ., ; Bloch and Prins, ; Alexandersson and Nordlund, ; Andrén and Palmer, ; Farrell et al, ; Försäkringskassan, ; Blank et al ., ; van Oostrom et al ., , ), there is some evidence of a reduction in sick leave due to monitoring or screening and setting time limits in the sickness insurance scheme (de Jong et al ., ; Hägglund, ; Johansson and Lindah, ; Hartman et al ., ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Early Interventions and Disability Insurance: Experience from a Field Experiment

Engström

¹

,

Hägglund

²

,

Johansson

³

2016

Econ J

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. The model predicts that the treatment effect is larger for individuals with low incentives to return to work. In order to test this prediction we estimate effects for sick listed employed and unemployed separately. Consistent with the model's prediction, we find that the effect is larger for the unemployed than for the employed.JEL Classification: C93, H51, H55, I18, J22

show abstract

“…Our study relates to Johansson and Lindahl (), who examine the effects of an information meeting (IM) on the duration of absence spells of (largely) non‐employed sick‐pay claimants; that is, persons who have already lost the job that originally made them eligible for sickness benefits. The IMs are organised by Swedish local SSA offices and the purpose of the meeting is to inform absentees about the criteria for continued sickness benefits.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Compulsory Dialogues Nudge Sick-Listed Workers Back to Work?

Markussen

¹

,

Røed

²

,

Schreiner

³

2017

The Economic Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu We evaluate the impacts of a compulsory dialogue meeting for long-term sick-listed workers in Norway. The meeting is organised by the local social security administration after around six months of absence, and its purpose is to bring together the absentee, the employer, and the family physician to discuss whether arrangements can be made to facilitate partial or full work resumption. Our causal analysis is based on random-assignment-like geographical variation in the meeting propensity. We find that the meetings reduce absence duration considerably, both through a notification and an attendance effect. They also reduce the risk of premature labour market exit. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARYCurbing long-term absenteeism and subsequent disability program entry is a major political concern in many welfare states. This paper examines the effects of a very inexpensive policy intervention aimed at this, namely a compulsory dialog meeting (DM) for long-term sick-listed workers in Norway. The meeting is organized by the local social security administration (SSA) after around six months of absence, and its purpose is to bring together the absentee, the employer, and the certifier of the sick-leave (the physician) to discuss whether arrangements can be made at the work-place that make full or partial work resumption possible. Using a duration model, we estimate the effects of the DM on the return-to-work hazard from sickness absence by exploiting that there has been substantial randomassignment-like variation in the use and exact timing of DMs in different parts of the country. This makes it possible to estimate separately a notification effect of being called to a DM, and a meeting attendance effect. Our main finding is that both the notification and attendance effects are positive, and that the meeting leads to a considerable reduction in sickness absence, and also reduces the risk of subsequent disability program entry. In total, our results imply that each realized meeting yields a reduction of around ten days in time until full work resumption, and a reduction of around 20 days in time until any form of work resumption (partial or full). Based on some simple cost-benefit calculations, we show that economic gains derived from earlier work resumption by far exceed the costs of arranging the meetings.

show abstract

“…There is also some evidence of ex ante effects in SI programs. Hägglund () finds an increase in the outflow from the sickness benefits just before the spell length reaches different monitoring points and Johansson and Lindahl () find an increased outflow from the sickness benefits when monitoring is increased in an ongoing spell.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self‐screening Effects of Monitoring: Evidence from a Quasi Experiment in the Swedish Temporary Parental Benefit Program

Skans

¹

,

Johansson

²

2018

Oxf Bull Econ Stat

Self Cite

0

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Monitoring and screening have been shown to be important to reduce moral hazard in social insurances. This paper empirically investigates whether monitoring in the Swedish temporary parental benefit program affects future benefit take‐up. Identification is based on the fact that parents’ benefit applications are monitored randomly by the insurer. The estimation results show that parents who are monitored are less likely to apply again in the near future.

show abstract

Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment

Cited by 14 publications

References 21 publications

Early Interventions and Disability Insurance: Experience from a Field Experiment

Early Interventions and Disability Insurance: Experience from a Field Experiment

Can Compulsory Dialogues Nudge Sick-Listed Workers Back to Work?

Self‐screening Effects of Monitoring: Evidence from a Quasi Experiment in the Swedish Temporary Parental Benefit Program

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About